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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCES M. BARGAR, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. BARGAR, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 950001-CA 
Priority Number 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(i) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Do the Supplemental Findings of Fact support the Court's 
Order set forth in paragraph 2(a) of the Supplemental Conclusions 
of Law1 and paragraph 2(a) of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce 
(Record at 277) terminating appellant's weekend visitation at 
6:00 p.m. on Sunday evening rather than 7:00 p.m. as set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35(2)(b) (1993). 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Interwest v. 
Palmer 886 P.2d 92, 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), Slattery v. Covery & 
Co. 857 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Abuse of Discretion. 
Tucker v. Tucker 881 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(quoting 
Sukin v. Sukin 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). 
Do the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered by the Court support the exclusion of the language in 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35(2)(g)(ix) which by implication broadens 
the Christmas day visitation for appellant as the non-custodial 
parent? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Interwest v. 
Palmer 886 P.2d 92, 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), Slattery v. Coverv & 
Co. 857 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Abuse of Discretion. 
Tucker v. Tucker 881 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(quoting 
Sukin v. Sukin 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). 
1
 Record of the trial court decision at 269, Bargar v. Bargar 
(Case No. 9247 00511) 
2 
Do the Supplemental Findings of Fact support paragraph 2(j) 
of the Supplemental Conclusions of Law (Record at 272) and 
paragraph 2(j) of the Supplemental Decree (Record at 280) 
permitting appellee to invade appellant's alternating weekend 
visitation for a period of four (4) to seven (7) hours on Sunday 
so that appellee can take the child to his church? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Interwest v. 
Palmer 886 P.2d 92, 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), Slatterv v. Coverv & 
Co. 857 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Abuse of Discretion. 
Tucker v. Tucker 881 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(quoting 
Sukin v. Sukin 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). 
3 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-33 (1993) 
(3) the Court may alter this schedule to make shorter 
visits of greater frequency or other arrangements 
consistent with the child's best interest for children 
under age 5; otherwise the visitation schedule as 
provided in §30-3-35 shall apply; 
(7) the Court may make alterations in the visitation 
schedule to reasonably accommodate the work schedule of 
both parents and may increase the visitation allowed to 
the non-custodial parent but shall not diminish the 
standardized visitation provided in §30-3-35; 
(16) each parent shall be entitled to an equal 
division of major religious holidays celebrated by the 
parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious 
holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall 
have the right to be together with the child on the 
religious holiday* 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-34(2) (1993) 
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in §30-3-33 
and the visitation schedule as provided in §30-3-35 
shall be presumed to be in the best interest of the 
child. The visitation schedule shall be considered the 
minimum visitation to which the non-custodial parent of 
the child shall be entitled unless a parent can 
establish otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The presumption may be rebutted based upon a finding of 
the Court, including any of the following criteria: 
(a) Visitation would endanger the child's 
physical health; 
(b) Visitation would significantly impair the 
child's emotional development; 
(c) A substantial allegation of child abuse 
exists; 
(d) A lack of demonstrated parental skills; 
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(e) The financial inability of the non-custodial 
parent to provide adequate food and shelter for the 
child during periods of visitation; 
(f) The preference of the child if the Court 
determines the child to be of sufficient maturity; 
(g) Incarceration of the non-custodial parent in 
a county jail, secure youth corrections facility, or an 
adult corrections facility; and 
(h) Any other criteria the Court determines 
relevant to the best interests of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35(2) (1993) 
(2) The parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, 
the following schedule shall be considered the minimum 
visitation to which the non-custodial parent and the 
child shall be entitled: . • . 
(b) Alternating weekends beginning on the first 
weekend after the entry of the Decree from 6:00 p.m. on 
Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday, continuing each year; 
(c) Holidays take precedence over the weekend 
visitation, and changes shall not be made to the 
regular rotation of the alternating weekend visitation 
schedule; 
(e) If the holiday falls on a weekend or on a 
Friday or Monday, the total holiday period extends 
beyond that time so that the child is free from school 
and the parent is free from work, the non-custodial 
parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday 
period; 
(g) In years ending in an even number, the non-
custodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(ix) The second portion of the Christmas 
school vacation as defined in subsection §30-3-32(3)(b) 
plus Christmas day beginning at 1:00 p.m. until 9:00 
p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is 
equally divided. 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case. This appeal is from a final judgment of 
the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County ordering the 
plaintiff and appellant herein, (1) to return the parties minor 
child one hour early after weekend visitation; (2) to have more 
limited Christmas visitation than statutorily mandated; and, (3) 
to allow defendant/appellee to take the child on plaintiff's 
weekend to his own LDS church meetings. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Plaintiff's action for divorce from defendant was filed in the 
District Court of Davis County, Utah on the 26th day of March, 
1992. Under temporary order of the Court, the parties had split 
custody of the their minor child, Caitlin Bargar, born June 19, 
1989, alternating week to week. Pursuant to Court Order, a child 
custody evaluation was done by Kim Peterson, MSW, and his report 
was filed with the Court and later updated approximately four 
months prior to the trial on the custody issue. 
By stipulation of the parties, the case was bifurcated so 
that plaintiff could obtain her divorce and enter into another 
marriage, and the divorce decree was entered the 2nd day of 
February, 1994. 
Appellee made several allegations against appellant in the 
general nature of child abuse over a period of almost two years 
and claimed that during the period of the marriage and prior to 
the separation, he was the primary caretaker for the parties' 
minor child. 
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During the separation and prior to trial, plaintiff sought 
counseling with Dallas Empey, Ph.D., and defendant sought 
counseling with Johanna McManemin, Ph.D., both of whom testified 
at the custody trial. 
The initial draft of the Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Decree were discussed between 
counsel, and attorney Craig Peterson, counsel for appellee then 
submitted a second draft in September, 1994. This second draft 
of the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Supplemental Decree were then submitted to the Court by Mr. 
Peterson on or about the 26th day of November, 1994 and signed 
and entered by the Court on the 30th day of November, 1994. 
Craig Peterson died in the crash of a private airplane on or 
about the 18th day of December, 1994, and Notice of Substitution 
of Counsel was filed on December 28, 1994, and Notice of Appeal 
was filed the 29th day of December, 1994. 
C. Statement of Facts. Upon making its Findings of Fact, 
the trial court gave great weight to the testimony of Johanna 
McManemin to the effect that it would be detrimental to the minor 
child to be deprived or removed from either home for a 
substantial period of time, and that greater than standard 
visitation is required in this case, and that it would be harmful 
and not in the child's best interest to fail to make provision 
for greater than standard visitation (Supplemental Findings of 
Fact ("Finding") #3 attached hereto as Exhibit "1", Record at 
255). 
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On that basis, it was necessary for the Court to develop 
something other than split-or joint-custody which had been 
occurring, yet give the minor child quality time with both 
parents (Finding #5, Record at 256). 
At the time of trial, the minor child, Caitlin Bargar, was 
five years old (Record at 216, lines 7-9). Due to the 
circumstances and the child's age the trial court found that the 
minor child must have a more stable environment and not go back 
and forth between the parties on a weekly basis as the parties 
had done during the pendency of the proceedings (Finding #8, 
Record at 257). 
The trial court further found that "From the time of 
separation, April, 1992, to the present, both parties have been 
exercising primary care and responsibility for Caitlin in an 
almost equal capacity based on time. The evidence presented to 
the Court indicated that "both parties have been doing an 
excellent job in providing for her basic care and needs during 
this time, hygiene, feeding," and other elements of physical care 
(Record at 258). 
As to other statutory criteria, the trial court found that 
the relative bond between the parties and Caitlin weighed more 
strongly in favor of the defendant (Finding #11, Record at 260). 
However, the court found that there are no issues of difference 
between the parties' abilities to provide basic care, supervision 
and suitable environment (Finding #12, Record at 260-261). 
At the time plaintiff filed for divorce, plaintiff was a 
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member of the LDS Church and complained of defendant's 
consumption of alcohol to the point of intoxication around the 
child. However, the trial court found that after the separation, 
defendant became "a convert to the LDS Church, ha[d] adopted 
their principles, and ha[d] demonstrated obvious abstinence from 
all alcohol" (Finding #13b, Record at 261-262). 
After a 21 month separation of the parties, plaintiff became 
pregnant out of wedlock over which the trial court expressed 
concern, but the court found that the acts of the plaintiff "are 
not to the level to create a problem that would prevent her from 
having the child in this case" (Finding #13d, Record at 262-263). 
Supporting its final decision the trial court stated, "The 
Court specifically finds that the training which Mr. Bargar has 
received in his parenting classes has given him significant 
skills and abilities to better deal with the issues in the care 
and supervision of Caitlin" (Finding #15, Record at 264). Then 
in stating its ruling the trial court said, "However, in the 
commitment to provide for the other parent, all of the evidence 
indicates that the defendant is more willing to provide 
visitation, more willing to provide for mediation, and is more 
willing to try to provide for a positive relationship" (Finding 
#17, Record at 268). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The statutory presumption set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-34 provides that the visitation schedule set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. §30-3-35 is in the best interests of the child unless a 
parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and any such preponderance of the evidence must be set 
forth in Findings of Fact that specifically address the eight 
criteria required to diminish the standardized visitation 
schedule. The one hour discrepancy in the time for return of the 
child at the termination of weekend visitation may well be a 
typographical error, and the omission of the qualifying language 
providing for return of the child at the end of visitation on 
Christmas day may well be inadvertent, but those changes from 
standardized visitation are not supported by the Findings, and 
are therefore an impermissible limitation on the standardized 
statutory visitation accorded to appellant. 
For the same reasons above set forth, the Court's order 
permitting appellee to encroach upon appellant's weekend 
visitation for a four hour period on Sunday for the sole purpose 
of permitting appellee to take the child to his church is not 
supported by any findings made by the Court. Further, such 
encroachment must be supported by one or more findings that 
comport with at least one of the eight exceptions of the 
standardized visitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-34. In 
fact, the Court made findings that both parties are good people 
and competent parents for the minor child, and that both parents 
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provide an environment that is good for their child. Based on 
the findings already made by the Court, any additional findings 
that would justify or support visitation limitations and 
restrictions that diminish the standardized visitation set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 would be in conflict. Limitations 
imposed on appellant for the return of the child at the 
termination of weekend visitation and at the termination of 
Christmas day visitation should be removed and the statutory 
provision should replace them. Further, the encroachment on 
appellant's Sunday visitation should be totally removed from the 




THE LIMITATIONS ON PLAINTIFF'S VISITATION ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
In his ruling from the bench, the trial judge stated: 
The holidays, there would be alternate holidays, 
subject to the state schedule• 
(Record at 233, line 23). 
In drafting the Findings and Conclusions, counsel for 
defendant provided that plaintiff's Christmas visitation in even 
numbered years is "second half of Christmas vacation, 1:00 p.m. 
to 9:00 p.m. on Christmas day" (Record at 271), but the statute 
provides in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35(2)(g)(ix): 
The second portion of the Christmas school vacation as 
defined in subsection §30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day 
beginning at 1:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. so long as the 
entire Christmas holiday is equally divided. 
The Decree should be modified as intended by the Court 
ruling to conform to the statute. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35(2)(b) provides: 
. . .alternating weekends beginning on the first 
weekend after the entry of the Decree from 6:00 p.m. on 
Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year. 
Paragraph 2(a) of the Conclusions of Law (Record at 269) 
counsel for defendant inadvertently provided that the visitation 
terminated at 6:00 p.m. on Sunday rather than 7:00 p.m. There 
are no findings or conclusions filed with the Court that justify 
the changes made by defendant to the statutory visitation. 
Rather, it was the finding and intent of the Court that the 
visitation accorded to plaintiff be substantially greater than 
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the statutory minimum visitation (Record at 231, lines 19-20). 
"Prior to the separation of the parties, plaintiff was the 
primary caretaker and provided the primary role of feeding, 
nurturing, caring, and most of the primary responsibilities for 
Caitlin. . . During the first two years and nine months of 
Caitlin's life, the defendant did have time available in which he 
could have provided day care, but because of his work schedule or 
for other reasons, he chose not to provide that day care. . • 
There were a number of times when he left the child in surrogate 
day care when he could have provided that responsibility for 
Caitlin during the marriage" (Finding #9, Record at 258). Until 
approximately six months after the separation of the parties, 
defendant was not a member of the LDS Church and consistently 
drank alcohol to the point of intoxication (Finding #13b, Record 
at 261-262). For the first three years and three months of the 
child's life, her only church experience was with the plaintiff. 
There are no findings to support any of the modifications 
set forth in the Conclusions of Law and the corresponding 
paragraphs in the Decree of Divorce. 
The only findings made by the Court that could possibly 
support the designated limitations on visitation are the findings 
that plaintiff did not set a good moral example for the child by 
becoming pregnant prior to the divorce becoming final (Finding 
#13d, Record at 262-263), the finding that Mr. Bargar received 
training after the separation that gave him significant skills 
and abilities to better deal with the issues in the care and 
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supervision of Caitlin (Finding #15, Record at 264), the finding 
that plaintiff had on occasion grabbed the child and spanked her 
(Finding #13c, Record at 262), the finding that the bond between 
defendant and the minor child was stronger than the bond between 
the minor child and plaintiff (Finding #10, Record at 259), the 
finding that defendant had become a convert to the LDS Church and 
had adopted their principles (Finding #13b, Record at 261). 
There is no finding that plaintiff's lifestyle, conduct, 
teachings, or example had an adverse affect on the minor child, 
and the actual finding of the Court was that none of the 
foregoing things would prevent plaintiff from having custody of 
the child. Based on the Court's finding that prior to separation 
plaintiff was the primary caretaker of the child, by implication, 
the Court found during the two years that the parties were 
separated prior to the initial Decree, defendant woke up to the 
fact that if he wanted the custody of the child, he had to be 
more than a de minimis parent. Because he was self-employed and 
had absolute control of his time, defendant then began to shower 
the child with attention while plaintiff, employed at Hill Air 
Force Base, continued to do the same things she had always done 
in the care and nurturing of the child (Findings #6, Record at 
257). (See also the Court's bench ruling Record at 230, lines 
14-20, attached hereto as Exhibit "2.") 
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POINT II 
THE CHURCH RESTRICTION IMPOSED UPON PLAINTIFF'S WEEKEND 
VISITATION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS, AND IS IN VIOLATION OF THE STATUTORY 
VISITATION ACCORDED PLAINTIFF 
If the child has attained the age of 5, the minimum 
visitation schedule set forth in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-33 shall 
apply, but may be altered by the Court for the reasons set forth 
in subparagraph (4) including "religious holidays, important 
ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the 
child." Further, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-33(16) provides: 
Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of 
major religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and 
the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the 
other parent does not celebrate, shall have the right 
to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
The fair implication of the statutory provisions is that the 
legislature recognized the important role that religion may have 
in the bonding between parent and child, no less for plaintiff 
than for defendant, and the statute gives no preference to the 
custodial parent. 
There is no finding that the parties live more than 150 
miles from their former residence, and it is presumed that the 
minimum visitation schedule set forth in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 
is in the best interest and welfare of the child unless the Court 
makes findings in any of the criteria in subparagraphs (a) 
through (h) set forth in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-34. A review of 
the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Record 
at 254-275) shows that no such findings or conclusions were ever 
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made by the Court. When counsel for appellant suggested to the 
trial court that the Sunday church provision was impractical, the 
trial court responded 
But for a child, as you go up and through a preliminary 
area, those kinds of activities, I think its important 
that there be—if you are going to have her be in one 
ward one week and another ward another week, I don't 
think that is a suitable arrangement, given the 
activities and things that go on. I don't think she 
would end up at home in either situation. So that's 
all I am saying. In arrangements, I think in this kind 
of case, should be—would be suitable for Mr. Bargar to 
make the arrangements to pick her up and return her as 
soon as it is over. 
(Record at 237, lines 11-21). 
Of the 26 weekends that appellant may have visitation with 
the minor child each year, she must have the child available for 
appellee to take to church on 24 of those Sundays (two weeks 
uninterrupted for vacation), and the visitation time lost is 
anywhere between four and seven hours each Sunday of appellant's 
weekend visitation depending on the varying schedules of 
meetings. Appellant may be in church at a totally different time 
than defendant's scheduled meetings, and unless plaintiff takes 
the child to church with the rest of her family, (in which event 
the child may be subject to six hours of church meetings every 
other Sunday), plaintiff has to arrange for some type of care 
while plaintiff's family attends church, or maximize the 
visitation by staying home from church herself. 
While it is true that the visitation granted by the Court is 
substantially greater than the minimum visitation set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35, it is illogical to believe that by 
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granting more than minimum visitation the legislature intended 
that the trial court could gerrymander the weekend visitation, 
and thus affect the religious training of the child. For 
examplef if plaintiff's religious persuasion was Reorganized LDS 
or Jehovah's Witness, will the Court be justified in saying that 
the child is better off going to just one church, and compensate 
plaintiff by given her an extra night each week for visitation? 
Or, if plaintiff and her husband elected to attend no organized 
church, can the Court by adding to the minimum statutory 
visitation an additional two weeks each summer, require that on 
the Sunday of her weekend visitation plaintiff surrender the 
child to go with defendant to his church without specific 
findings that affect the best interest and welfare of the child? 
Such results are contrary to the intent of the legislature 
expressed in the cited statutes. 
Though the trial court concludes (without any findings in 
support) that the Kaysville 15th Ward Church environment 
justifies the invasion of plaintiff's Sunday visitation, the 
Court did not mandate and indeed cannot require that defendant 
take the minor child to church when it is his weekend to have the 
child. The anomaly is that defendant can go camping, fishing, 
hunting, or just hang around on his weekend to have the child and 
take the child to church on plaintiff's weekend to visit, thus 
meeting the "significant part of her environment" suggested by 
the trial court (Supplemental Conclusions of Law 2(j), Record at 
272). But, the trial court's actual finding was to the contrary. 
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In its bench ruling the court said: "[T]he Court does not find 
that there are any issues about basic care, supervision and 
environment" (Record at 222, lines 19-20). On the other hand, 
plaintiff's weekend visitation is severely restricted: 
Visitation with relatives out of town, even mini-vacations on 
holiday weekends are made impractical by the requirement that 
plaintiff have the child available for defendant's four hour 
church time. Further, one of the significant elements of bonding 
between parent and child, is the evaluation by the child of the 
parent's professed value system against parental performance. 
The Court's order limits the child's perception of the 
appellant's commitment to her professed beliefs. 
Prior to the passage of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 (1993), the 
Court approved of a provision in a divorce decree requiring the 
non-custodial parent to deliver the minor child to the custodial 
parent on Sunday morning for the purpose of attending church with 
a loss of the balance of the Sunday visitation. Watson vs. 
Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Here the transcript of 
the Court's ruling shows appellant's concern about the Court's 
ruling on church attendance and it clearly appears that the 
Court's opinion and consequent ruling are not based on any 
findings of fact (Record at 237, line 23-238, line 16). After 
the Watson decision, the legislature enacted new visitation 
guidelines set forth in §§30-3-33 through 30-3-35. The Court 
reaffirmed its position in Sukin vs. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 923 
(Utah Ct. App 1992) as follows: 
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However, to insure the Court acted within its broad 
discretion, the facts and reasons for the Court's 
decision must be set forth fully in appropriate 
Findings and Conclusions. 
Id. at 923 (quoting Painter vs. Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988)). None of the Findings and Conclusions support 
the trial court's order limiting or restricting plaintiff's 
Sunday visitation. 
In Larsen vs. Larsen, 888 P.2d 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the 
Court considered religious compatibility as one of the factors in 
a custody dispute, stating: 
We believe the compatibility of a parent's and child's 
religious beliefs is not a matter that the Court should 
consider. 
Instead, religious compatibility is only a factor when 
there has been a showing that specific religious 
beliefs or practices are contrary to the child's 
general welfare. (See E. G., In Re Marriage of Short, 
698 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo. 1985) (Proper to consider 
religious beliefs and practices that are "reasonably 
likely to cause present or future harm to the physical 
or mental development of the child"); Osteraas vs. 
Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948, 953 (Idaho 1993), 
(Religiousness of parent not a factor in custody 
decision absent compelling reason otherwise); Compton 
vs. Gilmore, 560 P.2d 861, 863 (Idaho 1977) 
(Considering parent's conflicting religious beliefs 
improper absent "clear and affirmative showing that the 
conflicting religious beliefs affect the general 
welfare of the child.") 
Id. at 724. 
In Ebbert vs. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) the Court confirmed 
that where custody is challenged a mere finding that the parties 
are or are not fit and proper persons to be awarded the care, 
custody and control of the child are not adequate. The same flaw 
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exists in the findings presently before the Court where the trial 
court found both parties to be fit and proper parents but made no 
specific finding to support the conclusions concerning church 
attendance. Further, there is no finding that going to church 
with the mother is any less fulfilling for the child than going 
to church with the fatherf and no finding that the child was even 
old enough to state a preference or was, in any way, confused by 
going to two different LDS wards. 
If the Court should not consider religious compatibility in 
custody proceedings unless such practices are contrary to the 
child's general welfare, in like manner, religious compatibility 
should not be a concern in granting or restricting visitation. 
In Watson supra, the Court confirmed that the best interest and 
welfare of the child is the guiding principle. After all, there 
is no diversity of doctrine or discipline because both parents 
are LDS. But even if such diversity did exist, it is not a cause 
for limiting statutory visitation unless it adversely affects the 
general welfare of the child. In Khalsa vs. Khalsa, 751 P.2d 715 
(N.M. App. 1988) the Court stated: 
The Court should proceed cautiously and with 
circumspection when dealing with religious issues. 
Id. at 720. 
Further, in Munoz vs. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1971), the 
Court stated: 
The courts are reluctant. . .to interfere with the 
religious faith and training of children where the 
conflicting religious preferences of the parents are in 
no way detrimental to the welfare of the child. The 
obvious reason for such a policy of impartiality 
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regarding religious beliefs is that, constitutionally, 
American courts are forbidden from interfering with 
religious freedoms or to take steps preferring one 
religion over another. 
Thus, the rule appears to be well established that the 
courts should maintain an attitude of strict 
impartiality between religions and should not 
disqualify any applicant for custody or restrain any 
person having custody or visitation rights from taking 
the children to a particular church, except where there 
is a clear and affirmative showing that the conflicting 
religious beliefs affect the general welfare of the 
child. 
Id. at 1135 (Emphasis added) 
Concluding as it did regarding the restriction of teaching 
principles of another religion during visitation, the Court in 
Khalsa supra stated: 
In justifying a prohibition of religious restrictions 
on visitation rights, physical or emotional harm to the 
child cannot be assumed, but must be demonstrated in 
detail. . . Factual evidence of harm rather than "mere 
conclusions and speculation" is required (See also 
Hansen vs. Hansen, 404 N.W.2d 460 (N.D. 1987); Felton 
vs. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1981). 
Khalsa, 751 P.2d at 720. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is no finding by the Court that the best interest and 
welfare of the child are diminished by allowing the child to 
attend church with plaintiff during her weekend visitation. 
There is no finding that the best interest and welfare of the 
parties' minor child would be enhanced in any discernable way if 
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defendant is permitted to take the minor child to his church on 
the Sunday of plaintiff's visitation. The statutory presumption 
that the visitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 is in 
the best interest and welfare of the child was not rebutted by 
any of the findings and conclusions made by the Court from the 
bench or contained in the formal Findings and Conclusions entered 
by the Court. Though Watson supra lends some support to the 
trial court's Sunday church limitation it was decided before the 
1993 Utah legislature chose to pass laws and set public policy 
now codified in Utah Code Ann. §§30-3-33 through 30-3-35, and is 
therefore no longer applicable. It is the public policy of this 
State expressed through the legislature that the religious 
preferences of both parents as well as the minor child, are to be 
protected absent a specific finding that the best interest and 
welfare of the child are adversely affected by one or the other 
parents in matters of religion. Later Utah cases, and 
specifically Larsen supra, confirm this approach and accord to 
the decisions from other states some deference and validity in 
analyzing this problem. 
The case should be remanded to the trial court to modify the 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree to conform to the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 as to the hour that the child is to be 
returned at the termination of plaintiff's weekend visitation, 
adding to plaintiff's Christmas visitation in even numbered years 
the additional language of the statute, and striking from the 
Conclusions and the Decree the provision that requires plaintiff 
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to surrender the child to defendant during plaintiff's weekend 
visitation so that the child can attend church with defendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2S day of March, 1995. 
BEAN SMEDLEY 
DAVID E. BEAN-
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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The above matter came before the Court on the 23rd and 
24th days of June, 1994, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the Honorable 
Jon M. Memmott, Judge presiding for trial. The Plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by counsel, David E. Bean. The 
Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel, Craig 
M. Peterson. The Court having previously entered an Order 
bifurcating the proceedings, having entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce, and having reserved all 
remaining issues, specifically the issue of custody, to be 
determined at the time of trial, the Court having considered the 
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testimony of the witnesses for each of the parties, having 
considered the documents entered into evidence, having reviewed the 
pleadings herein and being well advised in the premises, does now 
enter its Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This Court does have continuing jurisdiction in this 
matter. 
2. The primary issue remaining to be determined in this 
case is the custody of the parties' minor child, Caitlin McClaine 
Bargar. 
3. In considering the issue of custody, the Court must 
review specific factors in determining the best interests of the 
child. In consideration of that issue, the testimony of Dr. 
Johanna McManemin and her opinions were by far the most relevant 
received by Court during the trial. The Court has given 
substantial weight to the testimony of Dr. McManemin in which she 
indicated that it would be detrimental to Caitlin to be deprived or 
removed from either home for a substantial period of time, that 
greater than standard visitation is required in this case, and that 
it would be harmful and not in Caitlin's best interest to fail to 
make provisions for greater than standard visitation time with each 
of the parents. 
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4• Doctor McManemin also testified that it clearly is 
not in Caitlin's best interest to continue the current custody 
arrangement, one week with each parent. That testimony of Dr. 
McManemin is also supported by Dr. Empey, by the Court appointed 
custody evaluator, Kim Peterson, and testimony of an independent 
witness, Darlene Galbraith. Both of the parties have also 
testified that the current visitation is not workable and is 
detrimental to Caitlin. 
5. Based on the foregoing, it is necessary for the 
Court to develop something other than the split- or joint-custody 
which has been occurring, yet give Caitlin quality time with both 
parents. The problem is made more difficult by the fact that the 
parents do have significant communication problems, a high level of 
distrust, and have demonstrated difficulty in the past with 
handling their differences. In fact, the parties have 
intentionally raised issues and acted with poor judgment in 
handling their disputes in an effort to either gain custody or hurt 
each other, conduct which has been detrimental to Caitlin in these 
proceedings. In addition, two days of trial, in and of itself, are 
an exhibition that the parents do not have the current capacity to 
work out their problems in the best interest of Caitlin. 
6. In reviewing the testimony presented and the 
evidence before the Court, the Court does find that over the last 
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two years, while this matter has been pending, the Defendant has 
realized the need to address Caitlin's interest and has taken 
actions and conduct that will be in the best interest of Caitlin 
more than has the Plaintiff. 
7. In two days of testimony before the Court, the 
Plaintiff, in all of her direct testimony, had an opportunity to 
present evidence and testimony about her current relationship, 
feelings or interaction with Caitlin. She presented virtually no 
such testimony, and instead, directed all of her efforts toward the 
Defendant. The most important issue before the Court is the 
relationship of the parties with their minor child. That the 
Plaintiff failed to present any direct testimony on that issue 
causes the Court great concern about the Plaintiff's relationship 
with Caitlin. In fact, Dr. Dallas Empey, an independent expert 
presented by the Plaintiff, testified that he felt initially that 
the Plaintiff's primary concern in seeking counseling for Caitlin 
in this case was to deal with the issues of the divorce, winning 
the divorce, and not primarily dealing with the best interests of 
Caitlin. 
8. All of the testimony from the experts and the 
parties show the Court that Caitlin must have a more stable 
environment and not go back and forth between the parties on a 
weekly basis. 
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9. In Caitlin's early childhood, from birth until 
approximately two years and nine months, the Plaintiff was the 
primary care taker. During this time, she provided the primary 
role of feeding, nurturing, caring, and most of the primary 
responsibilities for Caitlin. Defendant had a secondary role, 
primarily one of relationship where he would take her with him, be 
involved in events or doing things, but he did not provide a 
primary caretaking role during that time. During the first two 
years and nine months of Caitlin's life, the Defendant did have 
time available in which he could have provided day care, but 
because of his work schedule, or for other reasons, he chose not to 
provide that day care. There were a number of times when he left 
the child in surrogate day care when he could have provided that 
responsibility for Caitlin during the marriage. From the time of 
separation, April 1992, to the present, both parties have been 
exercising primary care and responsibility for Caitlin in an almost 
equal capacity based on time. The evidence presented to the Court 
indicates that both parties have been doing an excellent job in 
providing for her basic care and needs during this time, her 
hygiene, feeding, and other elements of physical care. There is no 
evidence before the Court which demonstrated that one party has 
more primary custodial responsibility for the last two years and 
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three months. Both parties have been providing essentially equal 
primary care and responsibility for Caitlin. 
10. Regarding the strength of the parental bonds and the 
emotional ties of the parties with Caitlin, during the initial time 
of Caitlin's life when the Plaintiff provided the primary care, she 
may have had a relatively greater strength and parental bond. But 
over the last two years and two months, and particularly as 
reported by Dr. McManemin and as supported by the custody 
evaluation of Kim Peterson, it is their professional opinion that 
the Defendant now has a stronger bond with Caitlin and she has a 
stronger bond with him than Caitlin does with the Plaintiff. In 
the opinion of these experts, it would be detrimental if that bond 
with Mr. Bargar was reduced or weakened in any way, although Dr. 
McManemin testified that the evidence indicated there was a strong 
bond with both parents and required that substantial time be spent 
with both parents. Kim Peterson presented an independent custody 
evaluation to the Court pursuant to Court Order. Mr. Peterson's 
report contained almost all of the evidence that the Court has 
heard in the last two days, which evidence was supplied to Mr. 
Peterson by way of interviews, letters, exhibits and responses. 
The parties had an opportunity, and in fact, did refute statements 
that were made in the exhibits to Kim Peterson and did explain all 
of their defenses to him. Kim Peterson, in making his evaluation, 
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had extensive background and information upon which to make his 
determination. He was able to review the material that was 
presented to the Court with the explanations or refuting materials. 
The Court finds that Mr. Peterson has heard and reviewed and is 
aware of almost all of the evidence which was presented to the 
Court. With all of this information which was available to Mr. 
Peterson, he states that Caitlin presents as more bonded with her 
father. During previous interviews or statements to Kim Peterson 
which were conducted more than a year ago, Kim Peterson was less 
definite on the issue of the relative strengths of parental bond. 
His supplemental report shows that Caitlin is more bonded with her 
father. 
11. The independent witness of the Plaintiff, Dr. Empey, 
testified that there was a very strong bond between the Plaintiff 
and Caitlin. However, Dr. Empey testified that he did not meet 
with the Defendant and could not comment on his relationship with 
Caitlin. Dr. Empey was unable to offer any professional opinion or 
weight or measure the strength of the bond between the Defendant 
and Caitlin. The Court finds that the relative bond between the 
parties and Caitlin weighs more strongly in favor of the Defendant. 
12. Considering the abilities of the parties to provide 
care, supervision and a suitable environment for Caitlin, the Court 
finds Dr. McManemin's testimony to be most relevant. She testified 
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that both parties are able to provide care, supervision and a 
suitable environment for the child. Kim Peterson's report 
supported Dr. McManemin's position. The Court finds that there are 
no issues of difference between the parties7 abilities to provide 
basic care, supervision and a suitable environment. 
13. There are, however, a number of environmental issues 
in relation to a suitable environment for Caitlin as follows: 
a. The Plaintiff raised the question of second-
hand smoke in the Defendant's permanent residence with the paternal 
grandmother, Mrs. Bargar. Second-hand smoke is an issue to the 
Court. However, based on the evidence presented, the Court finds 
that Mrs. Bargar has quit smoking, has not smoked since 1990, and 
second-hand smoke is not of concern. No one in the home is smoking 
and the child is not exposed to second-hand smoke. 
b. The Plaintiff raised the issue of Defendant's 
past behavior regarding drinking and consumption of alcohol around 
children to the point of intoxication. The Court finds that such 
behavior would effect the Court's concerns regarding a suitable 
environment for the child. However, the Court finds that the 
evidence presented shows that Mr. Bargar has been in abstinence 
from drinking alcohol for more than the past year. During that 
time, he has become a convert to the L.D.S. church, has adopted 
their principles and has demonstrated obvious abstinence from all 
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alcohol. The Court finds that while there is a record of past 
drinking, and that the drinking was to the point of intoxication on 
occasion, that issue is not one which currently needs to be weighed 
by the Court in determining the current suitability of the 
environment for Caitlin. 
c. The Defendant raised the issue of Plaintiff's 
inappropriate control in disciplining Caitlin. She has on occasion 
grabbed her and spanked her. There is some evidence before the 
Court that the Plaintiff has been excessive in grabbing and 
disciplining the child. However, the evidence presented has 
significantly exaggerated that discipline and has dealt with it as 
an abuse when it may be a matter of just poor judgment by the 
Plaintiff in dealing with a young girl and being a disciplinarian. 
That poor judgment does not rise to the level of making Plaintiff 
unfit in any way for the care, supervision or providing a suitable 
environment. It is an area that requires counseling and work by 
the Plaintiff to learn appropriate skills to deal with disciplining 
her child. 
d. Also raised before the Court has been the 
relationship of the Plaintiff with her current husband, Todd Smith, 
and her pregnancy prior to the termination of this marriage; as 
well as inappropriate conduct with Mr. Smith when Caitlin was 
present. There has not been substantial evidence that indicates in 
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any way that the Plaintiff and Mr. Smith were in bed together with 
Caitlin without clothes on or engaged in any inappropriate conduct. 
The Court finds that as to the allegations of sexual abuse through 
such conduct, there is not sufficient evidence to find that abuse 
or such conduct took place. However, in considering this evidence 
as it relates to morals issues which the Court is required to 
consider, one of the strongest issues is that of example by the 
parent. The Court notes that the Plaintiff becoming pregnant out 
of wedlock, and prior to the divorce being finalized, is of concern 
to the Court in consideration of moral values and a suitable 
environment. Although the acts of the Plaintiff are not to the 
level to create a problem that would prevent her from having the 
child in this case, it is an issue of concern to the Court. 
14. Considering the income and physical ability of the 
parties to provide for the child, the Plaintiff with the income of 
her new husband jointly has better financial ability to provide for 
the physical needs. However, the Defendant is able to generate 
sufficient income to meet the needs of himself and Caitlin, and he 
does not have exceptional expenses while living with his mother. 
He can provide a suitable environment and quality home for Caitlin 
at this time as well as can the Plaintiff. The Court has received 
pictures of Caitlin's environment with the Defendant. The pictures 
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show their home, the bedroom the neighborhood and associations to 
be an excellent environment* 
15. Also considering the ability to provide care, 
supervision and a suitable environment, Mr. Bargar has undertaken 
substantial training in parenting classes and counseling. The 
Court specifically finds that the training which Mr. Bargar has 
received in his parenting classes has given him significant skills 
and abilities to better deal with the issues in the care and 
supervision of Caitlin. 
16. In considering the care and emotional stability of 
the parents in this case, there were a number of claims made. 
Overall, both parents are good people and will make good parents 
for Caitlin. However, the Court does have some concerns which need 
to be noted: 
a. The Defendant has exercised poor judgment 
relating to Caitlin by the way he has dealt with the issues of 
abuse. His handling of the allegations, taking Caitlin to the 
police, and how the investigation was conducted through a 
psychologist rather than dealing with the other party, are probably 
an example of the poor communication process between these parties, 
but it put Caitlin through a process which the Court feels has been 
detrimental to her interests, and she should not have been required 
to go through the process without having more substantiation of the 
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allegations. That was very poor judgment on the Defendant's part 
in dealing with these issues. 
b. Issues have been raised by the Plaintiff 
regarding Defendant's current work and employment status. 
Defendant is self-employed and has been in the same business for 
approximately fifteen years. The Defendant does have stability in 
his employment. In addition, he has recently acquired a job as 
Water Master and continues in that position of responsibility. 
c. The Plaintiff raises concern about Defendant's 
mother providing for many of Caitlin's needs. The Court finds that 
allegation to be true, but that such activity by Caitlin's paternal 
grandmother is a positive environment and has many benefits. Most 
of the needs of Caitlin, when she has been in the Defendant's 
custody, have been provided by Mr. Bargar. 
d. The Plaintiff raised an issue of loaded guns in 
the Defendant's home. Those allegations were not substantiated by 
the Plaintiff. If they had been, it would demonstrate a 
significant character problem that a parent would leave a loaded 
gun or pistol accessible to a small child. However, the evidence 
presented in this case is such that the Court does not find that 
there has been any problem with loaded guns in the Defendant's home 
or bedroom. 
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e. The Defendant raises the issue that the 
Plaintiff has exhibited poor judgment in character by her 
demonstrated lack of communication with the Defendant and others 
regarding Caitlin's best interests or needs. The testimony of Dr. 
Empey shows the Court that Mrs. Bargar was aware that Dr. McManemin 
did contact Mrs. Bargar, Dr. McManemin informed her that she was 
working with Caitlin and was available for counseling, she 
requested Mrs. Bargar's participation, but Mrs. Bargar chose not to 
participate in the counseling with Dr. McManemin. 
f. The Court also received evidence from the 
testimony of Dr. Empey that he felt initially and for some time 
during the process that Mrs. Bargar,s primary concern in retaining 
Dr. Empey and seeking counseling for Caitlin in this case was to 
deal with the issues raised by the divorce, seek testimony 
unfavorable to the Defendant, and that she was not primarily 
concerned in dealing with the best interests of Caitlin. This was 
particularly demonstrated by the fact that the sessions with Dr. 
Empey were begun shortly after the custody evaluation was completed 
in this matter, that they were not pursued for a period of over six 
months even when Dr. Empey recommended that they be pursued, and 
that they were instituted again just prior to this divorce trial. 
The Court finds based on Dr. Empey's testimony and the Plaintiff's 
failure to contact Dr. McManemin, that there was not a sincere 
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interest by the Plaintiff to work in Caitlin's best interest as 
much as there was in dealing with the issues raised by these 
divorce proceedings. 
The Court gives significant weight to Dr. 
Empey's testimony, the Plaintiff's independent witness, that Dr. 
Empey was concerned in treatment and that the Plaintiff was more 
interested in dealing with divorce and custody issues than with the 
individual needs of Caitlin. That is especially important to the 
Court when considered in conjunction with the prior finding made in 
this matter that the primary case presented by the Plaintiff 
related to issues between the parties rather than testimony about 
the Plaintiff's relationship with Caitlin. The relationship of the 
Plaintiff and Caitlin was not raised in treatment, and not even in 
the case which has been presented before the Court during the 
trial. Dr. Empey testified that the sessions were geared to 
respond to the reports, to rehabilitate her or discredit the 
Defendant, even seeking reasons for allegations which were made 
against the Plaintiff. Dr. Empey was particularly concerned about 
the break in treatment of October to April when treatment would 
have been beneficial to Caitlin. He felt strongly that the 
Plaintiff needed to separate her anger against the Defendant from 
her relationship with Caitlin. She did not do that in treatment, 
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has not sought help for that purpose, and that is an issue which 
the Plaintiff has not coped with fully at this time. 
17. The Court has looked at the issue raised by the 
Plaintiff that the basis of Defendant's increased interest and 
motivation to provide for Caitlin has been motivated in part to 
retaliate or get back at the Plaintiff rather than totally for 
Caitlin's best interest. The Court finds that there has been 
motivation by both parties in this respect and that each of them 
does have some self-interest which is natural as a motivating 
factor in custody cases. The evidence before the Court indicates 
that such behavior is going to continue. However, in the 
commitment to provide for the other parent, all of the evidence 
indicates that the Defendant is more willing to provide visitation, 
more willing to provide for mediation, and is more willing to try 
to provide for a positive relationship. The testimony indicates 
that there have been more negative things said by the Plaintiff 
with relation to the counseling sessions than has been provided by 
Mr. Bargar. Mr. Bargar is more committed to mediating the parties' 
problems and resolving the differences between them. 
18. The parties are earning generally equal incomes of 
approximately $1,500 per month. The Plaintiff has health insurance 
available through her employment. 
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19. Each of the parties has equal ability to pay 
attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court 
does now enter its just and equitable Conclusions of Law as 
follows: 
1. The parties in this case should be awarded the joint 
legal custody of their daughter, Caitlin Bargar. This award of 
joint legal custody should be controlled by Utah Code Annotated, § 
30-3-10, et sea. 
2. The Defendant, Robert Bargar, should be awarded the 
primary physical custody of Caitlin, and there should be 
substantial liberal visitation reserved in the Plaintiff as 
follows: 
a. The Plaintiff should be awarded visitation 
every other weekend. Plaintiff currently has every other Friday 
off. Accordingly, she should be entitled to pick up Caitlin for 
visitation as soon as the child is available on Friday. If Caitlin 
is in school, then visitation should commence as soon as Caitlin is 
out of school, whatever time that occurs. Visitation should 
continue through 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. 
b. When Caitlin is not in school, visitation 
should be allowed to commence on Thursday evening. 
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c. The Plaintiff should be allowed custodial 
visitation during the summer. This visitation should be two 
continuous months. When the Plaintiff has this continuous 
visitation during the summer, the Defendant should have the right 
to reciprocal visitation which should be the same as that reserved 
in the Plaintiff. If Caitlin is in year-around school, this 
visitation will, of necessity, have to be worked out to coordinate 
with the school schedule. 
d. Each of the parties should be entitled to two 
weeks of uninterrupted visitation for purposes of vacation. 
e. During the summer of 1994, before the schedule 
begins, the Court should award Mrs. Bargar the month of July and 
Mr. Bargar the month of August, then Mr. Bargar should retain 
Caitlin for the commencement of school and the visitation schedule 
as outlined herein should commence. During the months of July and 
August, each of the parties should be entitled to exercise 
visitation with Caitlin. 
f. In addition to every other weekend, the 
Plaintiff should also be entitled to two evenings per week, Tuesday 
and Thursday evenings. This is an extra day which is added on to 
the standard visitation schedule now set out by Utah State law. 
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g. The parties should also attempt to work out 
additional visitation which can be agreed upon through the process 
of counseling, 
h. The parties should exercise holiday visitation 
pursuant to the Uniform Visitation Schedule, which holiday 
visitation should be exercised by Plaintiff as follows: 
Holidays: (6:00 p.m. day before holiday to 7:00 p.m. 
day of the holiday unless specified otherwise.) 
Odd Numbered Years 
Human Rights Day 
Easter from Friday, 6:00 p.m. to Sunday, 7:00 p.m. 
Memorial Day - Friday, 6:00 p.m. to Monday, 7:00 
p «m. 
July 24th to 11:00 p.m. 
Veteran's Day 
Day before or after child's birthday 
3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
First half of Christmas vacation, including 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day to 1:00 p.m. 
Even Numbered Years 
New Year's Day 
President's Day 
July 4th to 11:00 p.m. 
Labor Day from Friday, 6:00 p.m. to Monday, 7:00 
p.m. 
Columbus Day 
UEA weekend from Wednesday, 6:00 p.m. to Sunday, 
7:00 p.m. 
Child's actual birthday to 9:00 p.m. 
Thanksgiving from Wednesday, 7:00 p.m. to Sunday, 
7:00 p.m. 
Second half of Christmas vacation, 1:00 p.m. to 
9:00 p.m. on Christmas Day 
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i. Counseling by Caitlin with Dr. McManemin should 
continue on a schedule which is set up by both parents, and both 
parents should be required to participate. Initially, the parties 
may be involved individually in this counseling. However, as Dr. 
McManemin feels is appropriate, the parties should meet with her to 
deal with the issues of working with Caitlin so that they can 
mutually work out between them the issues of discipline and 
organization so that Caitlin is handled and treated the same in 
both homes. Resolution should be reached with both parties having 
input and a mutual agreement of how to deal with issues of 
discipline, school and all of the necessary issues of joint legal 
custody. The process with Dr. Johanna McManemin is intended to 
help the parties to learn how to mediate or work out these issues. 
j. Caitlin has been attending church in the 
Kaysville Fifteenth Ward at this time, and that is a significant 
part of her environment. During the weekend visitation, the 
Plaintiff should make arrangements for Caitlin to attend Kaysville 
Fifteenth Ward on a regular basis. That should also continue when 
the Plaintiff exercises two months of custody. The child should 
attend one ward or one church as regularly as possible. For the 
purpose of attending church, the Defendant should pick up the 
child, take her to church, then return her to the Plaintiff 
following the completion of the scheduled church activities. The 
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Defendant should not pick up the child for any purpose other than 
to take her to church and should be required to return her 
immediately following church services and activities. If the 
Defendant is not going to take Caitlin to church on a particular 
Sunday, then he should give notice to the Plaintiff of that intent 
in a timely manner. 
3. The Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant the sum of 
$194 per month as child support. That payment should be made for 
the ten months which the child is in the custody of the Defendant. 
Credit will be given to the Plaintiff for one-half of the costs of 
medical insurance for Caitlin. That may be deducted from the 
payment of $194 in child support. During the two months that 
Caitlin is in the custody of the Plaintiff, the Defendant should 
pay child support in the amount of $194. The payment of child 
support should commence with the month of September, 1994. 
4. The Plaintiff should continue to pay for and provide 
health insurance for Caitlin. Each of the parties should pay one-
half of any uninsured medical costs which are incurred for 
Caitlin's benefit. Any medical costs which are so incurred and not 
reported to the other parent within thirty days should not be 
recoverable as provided by State law. 
5. Each of the parties should be awarded their personal 
property as it is currently in their possession, providing that the 
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Defendant should be entitled to a copy of all pictures and videos, 
and that each party should pay one-half the cost of reproducing the 
pictures and videos. However, if the Plaintiff does not want a 
certain picture, that can be given to the Defendant without cost. 
To avoid any question in the procedure in this process, all 
pictures should be turned over to the Defendant. Any copies which 
the Defendant wants, he should identify. If the Plaintiff does not 
want the picture, then it need not be copied, but if each party 
wants a copy of the picture or the video, then copies should be 
made and each pay one-half of those costs. 
6. There should be no Order requiring the maintenance 
of life insurance in this case. 
7. Each party should be responsible to assume any debt 
which they have incurred in their own name. 
8. The Defendant should be awarded the right to claim 
Caitlin as a dependent for the purpose of filing state and federal 
income tax returns. 
9. Each party should be ordered to keep the other 
advised of their telephone number and address at all times. In the 
event of any change in telephone number or address, the other party 
should be notified immediately. In addition, if the parties are 
going on vacation, they need to provide a reasonable itinerary of 
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the vacation to the other party, containing telephone numbers where 
they can be reached in the event of an emergency. 
10. A Mutual Injunction should be entered in this matter 
against each of the parties from any annoyance, harassment or harm 
of the other. 
DATED this 6Q day of September, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
^^m. \ue^5 l r 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, this 9th day of September, 1994, to: 
David E. Bean, Esq. 
190 South Fort Lane, #2. 
Layton, Utah 84041 
/ 
35. / i?/ 
CRAIG M. PETERSON (2579) 
Attorney for Defendant 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 




ROBERT W. BARGAR, : 
Defendant. : Case No. 924700511 
: Judge Rodney Page 
ooOoo 
The above matter came before the Court on the 23rd and 
24th days of June, 1994, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., and continuing 
thereafter until concluding, the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, Judge 
presiding for trial. The Plaintiff was present in person and 
represented by counsel, David E. Bean. The Defendant was present 
in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson. The Court 
having heretofore entered its Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and having previously entered a Decree of 
Divorce in this matter, does now enter its Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce as follows: 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 0 0 2 8 0 7 9 2 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The parties in this case shall be awarded the joint 
legal custody of their daughter, Caitlin Bargar. This award of 
joint legal custody shall be controlled by Utah Code Annotated, § 
30-3-10, et seq. 
2. The Defendant, Robert Bargar, shall be awarded the 
primary physical custody of Caitlin, and there shall be substantial 
liberal visitation reserved in the Plaintiff as follows: 
a. The Plaintiff shall be awarded visitation every 
other weekend. Plaintiff currently has every other Friday off. 
Accordingly, she shall be entitled to pick up Caitlin for 
visitation as soon as the child is available on Friday. If Caitlin 
is in school, then visitation will commence after Caitlin is out of 
school, whatever time that occurs. Visitation shall continue 
through 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. 
b. When Caitlin is not in school, visitation shall 
be allowed to commence on Thursday evening. 
c. The Plaintiff shall be allowed custodial 
visitation during the summer. This visitation will be two 
continuous months. When the Plaintiff has this continuous 
visitation during the summer, the Defendant shall have the right to 
reciprocal visitation which will be the same as that reserved in 
the Plaintiff. If Caitlin is in year-around school, this 
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visitation will, of necessity, need to be worked out to coordinate 
with the school schedule. 
d. Each of the parties shall be entitled to two 
weeks of uninterrupted visitation for purposes of vacation. 
e. During the summer of 1994, before the schedule 
begins, Mrs. Bargar is awarded the month of July and Mr. Bargar the 
month of August, then Mr. Bargar shall retain Caitlin for the 
commencement of school and the visitation schedule as outlined 
herein will commence. During the months of July and August, each 
of the parties shall be entitled to exercise visitation with 
Caitlin. 
f. In addition to every other weekend, the 
Plaintiff shall also be entitled to two evenings per week during 
the alternate week, Tuesday and Thursday evenings. This is an 
extra day which is added to the standard visitation schedule now 
set out by Utah State law. 
g. The parties shall also attempt to work out 
additional visitation which can be agreed upon through the process 
of counseling. 
h. The parties shall exercise holiday visitation 
pursuant to the Uniform Visitation Schedule, which holiday 
visitation shall be exercised by Plaintiff as follows: 
Holidays: (6:00 p.m. day before holiday to 7:00 p.m. 
day of the holiday unless specified otherwise.) 
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Odd Numbered Years 
Human Rights Day 
Easter from Friday, 6:00 p.m. to Sunday, 7:00 p.m. 
Memorial Day - Friday, 6:00 p.m. to Monday, 7:00 
p.m. 
July 24th to 11:00 p.m. 
Veteran's Day 
Day before or after child's birthday 
3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
First half of Christmas vacation, including 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day to 1:00 p.m. 
Even Numbered Years 
New Year's Day 
President's Day 
July 4th to 11:00 p.m. 
Labor Day from Friday, 6:00 p.m. to Monday, 7:00 
p.m. 
Columbus Day 
UEA weekend from Wednesday, 6:00 p.m. to Sunday, 
7:00 p.m. 
Child's actual birthday to 9:00 p.m. 
Thanksgiving from Wednesday, 7:00 p.m. to Sunday, 
7:00 p.m. 
Second half of Christmas vacation, 1:00 p.m. to 
9:00 p.m. on Christmas Day 
i. Counseling by Caitlin with Dr. McManemin shall 
continue on a schedule which is set up by both parents, and both 
parents shall be required to participate. Initially, the parties 
may be involved individually in this counseling. However, as Dr. 
McManemin feels is appropriate, the parties shall meet with her to 
deal with the issues of working with Caitlin so that they can 
mutually work out between them the issues of discipline and 
organization so that Caitlin is handled and treated the same in 
both homes. Resolution shall be reached with both parties having 
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input and a mutual agreement of how to deal with issues of 
discipline, school and all of the necessary aspect of joint legal 
custody. The process with Dr. Johanna McManemin is intended to 
help the parties to learn how to mediate or work out these issues. 
j. During the weekend visitation, the Plaintiff 
shall make arrangements for Caitlin to attend Kaysville Fifteenth 
Ward on a regular basis. That shall also continue when the 
Plaintiff exercises two months of custody. The child shall attend 
one ward or one church as regularly as possible. For the purpose 
of attending church, the Defendant will pick up the child one-half 
hour before church, take her to church, then return her to the 
Plaintiff one-half hour following the completion of the scheduled 
church activities. The Defendant shall not pick up the child for 
any purpose other than to take her to church and will be required 
to return her immediately following church services and activities. 
If the Defendant is not going to take Caitlin to church on a 
particular Sunday, then he shall give notice to the Plaintiff of 
that intent in a timely manner. 
3. The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the sum of 
$194 per month as child support. That payment shall be made for 
the ten months which the child is in the custody of the Defendant. 
Credit will be given to the Plaintiff for one-half of the costs of 
medical insurance for Caitlin. That may be deducted from the 
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payment of $194 in child support. During the two months that 
Caitlin is in the custody of the Plaintiff, the Defendant shall pay 
child support in the amount of $194. The payment of child support 
shall commence with the month of September, 1994. 
4. The Plaintiff shall continue to pay for and provide 
health insurance for Caitlin. Each of the parties will pay one-
half of any uninsured medical costs which are incurred for 
Caitlin's benefit. Any medical costs which are so incurred and not 
reported to the other parent within thirty days shall not be 
recoverable as provided by State law. 
5. Each of the parties shall be awarded their personal 
property as it is currently in their possession, providing that the 
Defendant shall be entitled to a copy of all of pictures and 
videos, and that each party shall pay one-half the cost of 
reproducing the pictures and videos. However, if the Plaintiff 
does not want a certain picture, that can be given to the Defendant 
without cost. To avoid any question in the procedure in this 
process, all pictures and videos shall be turned over to the 
Defendant. Any copies which the Defendant wants, he must identify. 
If the Plaintiff does not want the picture, then it need not be 
copied, but if each party wants a copy of the picture or the video, 
then copies shall be made and each pay one-half of those costs. 
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6. There shall be no Order requiring the maintenance of 
life insurance in this case. 
1. Each party shall be responsible to assume any debt 
which they have incurred in their own name. 
8. The Defendant shall be awarded the right to claim 
Caitlin as a dependent for the purpose of filing state and federal 
income tax returns. 
9. Each party shall be ordered to keep the other 
advised of their telephone number and address at all times. In the 
event of any change in telephone number or address, the other party 
shall be notified immediately. In addition, if the parties are 
going on vacation, they need to provide a reasonable itinerary of 
the vacation to the other party, containing telephone numbers where 
they can be reached in the event of an emergency, 
10. A Mutual Injunction is entered in this matter 
against each of the parties enjoining them from any annoyance, 
harassment or harm of the other. 
DATED this 3 Q "day of November, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
TATE OF UTAH )
 ss. 
ICUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
0^v~*.v 
District Court Judge 
J^-^mfl^- •
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE, this 
9th day of September, 1994, to: 
David E. Bean, Esq. 
190 South Fort Lane, #2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
p11\bargar.dod 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS 
5 FRANCES M. BARGAR, 
PLAINTIFF, 
6 TRANSCRIPT OF JUDGE'S ORDER 
7 CASE NO. 924700511 
VS. 
8 
ROBERT W. BARGAR, 
9 DEFENDANT. 
10 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 24TH DAY OF JUNE, 
11 1994, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE CAME ON FOR HEARING BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT, DISTRICT JUDGE. 
12 
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FOR THE DEFENDANT 
DAVID E. BEAN 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
190 S. FORT LANE #2 
LAYTON, UT 84041 
CRAIG M. PETERSON 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 SO. 500 E. 







JOANNE PRATT, CSR 
JUSTICE COMPLEX 
800 WEST STATE STREET 
FARMINGTON, UT 84025 
1 JUNE 24, 1994 
2 THE COURT: THE COURT, HAVING HEARD TESTIMONY 
3 AND RECEIVED EXHIBITS AND RECEIVED THE REPORT, CUSTODY 
4 EVALUATION, BOTH THE ORIGINAL AND UPDATED, OF KIM 
5 PETERSON, WILL ISSUE THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS AND RULING IN 
6 THIS CASE. 
7 THIS CASE IS PRIMARILY AN ISSUE OVER THE 
8 CUSTODY OF ONE CHILD, CAITLIN MCLAIN BARGAR, 
9 FIVE-YEAR-OLD CHILD OF THE PARTIES. THE COURT, IN MAKING 
10 THE FINDING RELATIVE TO THE CHILD, MAKES THE FOLLOWING 
11 DETERMINATIONS. THAT THE FIRST COMMENT THAT THE COURT 
12 WOULD MAKE MAY NOT BE DIRECTLY AS TO THE FINDING, BUT MAY 
13 BE MORE OF AN EDITORIAL COMMENT THAT PROBABLY IS 
14 PERTINENT IN A CASE LIKE THIS. I THINK THAT AS THE COURT 
15 HAS LISTENED TO THE TESTIMONY AND RECOGNIZED THIS 
16 PROCESS, HOW IT HAS OPERATED OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS 
17 WHILE CUSTODY HAS BEEN AT ISSUE IN THIS LAWSUIT, THAT 
18 INDICATES THAT THIS IS PROBABLY A CLASS OF CASE — AND 
19 THERE ARE MANY — THIS IS NOT DISTINGUISHABLE JUST TO 
20 THIS CASE, BUT THERE ARE MANY CASES WHICH ESTABLISH, AT 
21 LEAST TO THIS COURT, WHY THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS IS 
22 PROBABLY ONE OF THE WORST PROCESSES FOR DETERMINING CHILD 
23 CUSTODY THAT WE HAVE DEVELOPED IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM. THAT 
24 WE FOSTER A SYSTEM IN WHICH WE REQUIRE PARTIES TO SHOW 
25 HOW BAD THE OTHER IS TO ESTABLISH CUSTODY. WHEN, IF YOU 
1 REALLY TRY TO DETERMINE WHAT IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
2 THE CHILDREN IN FAMILIES, YOU NEED TO DEVELOP A SYSTEM 
3 THAT WILL PUT A DIVORCE AND BAD FEELINGS OF THE PARTIES 
4 BEHIND THEM, RECOGNIZING THAT MARRIAGES ARE OVER BUT THAT 
5 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO BE PARENTS AND TO BE AN INTERESTED 
6 PARENT AND PROVIDE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN IS 
7 NOT OVER AND TO FOSTER THAT. AND SO THIS COURT, IN 
8 MAKING A RECORD HERE AND MAKING A RECORD OF OTHER THINGS, 
9 I THINK WANTS TO BE SURE TO INDICATE THAT THE PROCESS 
10 THAT WE'VE DEVELOPED REALLY DOESN'T WORK VERY WELL AND 
11 THERE ARE OTHER PROCESSES I THINK WOULD BE MUCH BETTER 
12 FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES LIKE THIS. 
13 WITH THAT, THE COURT — AND THE LEGAL STANDARD 
14 THAT HAS BEEN SET FORTH FOR THE COURT, THERE ARE A NUMBER 
15 OF FACTORS IN DETERMINING CUSTODY. THE MOST IMPORTANT 
16 FACTOR, REALLY THE CONTROLLING FACTORS THAT ARE SET FORTH 
17 FOR THE COURT IN DETERMINING BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. 
18 AND THAT HAS TO BE THE OVERRIDING FACTOR THAT THIS COURT 
19 USES IN DETERMINING THE CUSTODY. AND IN THAT, AS TO THAT 
20 ISSUE, I THINK DR. JOHANNA MCMANEMIN'S TESTIMONY AND 
21 OPINION WAS BY FAR THE MOST RELEVANT THAT THE COURT 
22 RECEIVED DURING THIS TRIAL. AND I THINK PARTICULARLY HER 
23 TESTIMONY IN WHICH SHE INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE 
24 DETRIMENTAL FOR CAITLIN TO BE DEPRIVED OR REMOVED FROM 
25 EITHER HOME FOR A SUBSTANTIAL PERIOD OF TIME. THAT IF WE 
1 HAD A SITUATION THAT ONLY HAD STANDARD VISITATION AND 
2 CAITLIN DID NOT HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL OPPORTUNITY TO BE WITH 
3 EITHER PARENT IN THIS CASE, THAT IT WOULD BE HARMFUL FOR 
4 HER AND IT WOULD NOT BE IN HER BEST INTERESTS. 
5 SHE DID ALSO INDICATE THAT IT CLEARLY ISN'T IN 
6 CAITLIN'S BEST INTERESTS TO HAVE THE CURRENT CUSTODY 
7 ARRANGEMENT CONTINUE. AND I THINK THAT HER OPINION WAS 
8 SUPPORTED BY DR. EMPEY, KIM PETERSON IN HIS REPORT TO THE 
9 COURT. THE TESTIMONY RECEIVED BY DARLENE GALBRAITH, 
10 REALLY AN INDEPENDENT WITNESS, I THINK VERIFIED THAT. 
11 BUT I THINK BOTH OF THE PARTIES HAVE ALSO INDICATED THAT 
12 THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT IS NOT WORKABLE AND DETRIMENTAL 
13 FOR CAITLIN AT THIS TIME. THEREFORE, THE CHALLENGE TO 
14 THE COURT, BASED ON THE TESTIMONY AND BASED ON THE LEGAL 
15 STANDARDS, IS TO DEVELOP SOMETHING OTHER THAN SPLIT 
16 CUSTODY THAT WILL GIVE CAITLIN QUALITY TIME WITH BOTH 
17 PARENTS. AND THE COURT, GIVEN THE TESTIMONY AND THE 
18 PRIOR ACTION OF THE PARTIES, RECOGNIZES THAT THIS IS 
19 GOING TO BE QUITE A CHALLENGE, GIVEN THE PARENTS DO HAVE 
20 SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS AT THIS TIME. A HIGH 
21 LEVEL OF DISTRUST HAS BEEN EXHIBITED THROUGH THE 
22 TESTIMONY AND HOW THIS HAS BEEN HANDLED BEFORE THE 
23 COURT. AND THE COURT EVEN FINDS THAT THERE APPEARS TO 
24 BE INSTANCES WHERE THE PARTIES HAVE INTENTIONALLY RAISED 
25 ISSUES AND ACTED ON WHAT THE COURT WOULD FIND TO BE GOOD 
1 RATIONAL JUDGMENT IN HANDLING DISPUTES BETWEEN THE 
2 PARTIES IN AN EFFORT TO EITHER GAIN CUSTODY OR HURT EACH 
3 OTHER AND THAT CONDUCT MANY TIMES HAS BEEN DETRIMENTAL TO 
4 CATEY IN THIS PROCESS. THAT'S A MAJOR CHALLENGE FOR THE 
5 COURT TO IMPOSE, GIVEN THOSE PARAMETERS. AND ALSO I 
6 THINK THE FACT THAT WE'RE HERE, WE'VE BEEN IN TRIAL FOR 
7 TWO DAYS, WOULD ALSO EXHIBIT THAT THE PARENTS DON'T HAVE 
8 THE CURRENT CAPACITY TO WORK THIS OUT IN THE BEST 
9 INTERESTS. AND SO THE COURT, GIVEN THOSE PARAMETERS, IS 
10 GOING TO HAVE TO DO THE BEST IT CAN. AND I WOULD NOTE 
11 THIS TO THE PARTIES: THAT AS A COURT, I'M GOING TO GIVE 
12 THE BEST ORDER THAT I BELIEVE THAT I CAN ON THE EVIDENCE. 
13 HOWEVER, I KNOW, HAVING BEEN INVOLVED WITH CHILDREN OF MY 
14 OWN, A NUMBER OF THEM AND BEING INVOLVED WITH A NUMBER OF 
15 PARTIES, THAT NO ORDER OF THE COURT IS GOING TO CREATE 
16 THE BEST INTERESTS OF CAITLIN; ONLY THE PARENTS CAN DO 
17 THIS. AND IN LISTENING TO THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY, 
18 THE COURT DOES HAVE A SENSE OF VIEW THAT OVER THE LAST 
19 YEAR OR TWO YEARS I THINK THAT MR. BARGAR HAS REALIZED 
20 THIS MORE THAN MRS. BARGAR — THAN MRS. SMITH, IN TERMS 
21 OF ACTIONS AND CONDUCT THAT WILL BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS 
22 OF CAITLIN. I THINK ONE MAJOR ISSUE THAT THE COURT WOULD 
23 LIKE TO ADDRESS, AND I STARTED AND THE COURT IN GOING 
24 THROUGH AS I LOOKED AT THE TESTIMONY, THAT THE ISSUE 
25 THAT'S BEFORE THE COURT IS CAITLIN'S CUSTODY. AND ONE OF 
1 THE THINGS THAT CONCERNS THE COURT SIGNIFICANTLY, THE 
2 FACT THAT AS THE COURT I WAS REALLY, TO BE HONEST, QUITE 
3 SURPRISED IN A CASE LIKE THIS, THAT IN TWO DAYS OF 
4 TESTIMONY THAT THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE, ALL HER DIRECT 
5 TESTIMONY AND OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY HERE ON DIRECT 
6 TESTIMONY, THAT THE COURT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY TESTIMONY 
7 ABOUT HER CURRENT RELATIONSHIP OR FEELINGS OR INTERACTION 
8 WITH CAITI. AND THAT WHAT SHE DIDN'T TESTIFY ABOUT 
9 CONCERNS THE COURT AND RAISES AN ISSUE FOR THE COURT THAT 
10 WAS ADDRESSED IN SOME OF THE OTHER TESTIMONY. BECAUSE TO 
11 THE COURT, THAT'S THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE THAT WE'RE 
12 HERE FOR, IS THOSE FEELINGS, THOSE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
13 THE PARTIES. 
14 WITH THAT, THERE'S CERTAIN SPECIFIC FINDINGS 
15 THAT THE COURT WOULD LIKE TO MAKE. THE FIRST THE COURT 
16 HAS ALREADY MADE IS THAT THERE'S A NEED FOR STABILITY IN 
17 THE CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENT. THAT THE CURRENT ALTERNATE 
18 WEEK CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE A STABLE 
19 ENVIRONMENT FOR CAITLIN. THAT IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A 
20 MORE STABLE ENVIRONMENT, THE TESTIMONY OF DR. EMPEY, KIM 
21 PETERSON, DR. JOHANNA MCMANEMIN AND EVEN THE PARTIES 
22 THEMSELVES, HAS INDICATED THAT THERE HAS TO BE A 
23 RELATIONSHIP OR A CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH CAITLIN 
24 HAS A MORE STABLE ENVIRONMENT AND DOES NOT GO BACK AND 
25 FORTH BETWEEN THE HOMES ON A WEEKLY BASIS. 
1 IN REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE AS TO THE 
2 MAINTAINING AND EXISTING OF PRIMARY CUSTODIAL BONDS 
3 BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND CAITLIN IN THIS CASE, THE COURT 
4 WOULD FIND — MAKE THE FOLLOWING FINDING BASED ON THE 
5 EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS PRESENTED TO THE COURT. THAT IN 
6 CAITLIN'S EARLY CHILDHOOD FROM BIRTH UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 
7 TWO YEARS NINE MONTHS, THAT THE PLAINTIFF, FRAN BARGAR, 
8 WAS THE PRIMARY CARETAKER OF CAITLIN. THAT DURING THIS 
9 TIME SHE PROVIDED FOR THE PRIMARY ROLE OF FEEDING, 
10 NURTURING, CARING, PUTTING TO BED, PRIMARY 
11 RESPONSIBILITIES OF CAITLIN. THAT MR. BARGAR HAD A 
12 SECONDARY ROLE IN THIS. THAT HIS ROLE WAS PRIMARILY A 
13 RELATION ROLE WITH HER AND WOULD TAKE HER, BE INVOLVED IN 
14 EVENTS OR DOING THINGS, BUT DID NOT PROVIDE A PRIMARY 
15 CARE-TAKING ROLE FOR THE FIRST TWO YEARS AND NINE MONTHS. 
16 IT WAS OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE TO THE COURT THAT MR. BARGAR 
17 DURING THIS FIRST TWO YEARS AND NINE MONTHS DID HAVE TIME 
18 AVAILABLE IN WHICH HE COULD PROVIDE CERTAIN DAY CARE. 
19 BUT BECAUSE OF HIS WORK SCHEDULE, FOR WHATEVER REASON, HE 
20 CHOSE NOT TO PROVIDE THAT DAY CARE AND THERE WERE A 
21 NUMBER OF TIMES HE LEFT THE CHILD IN DAY CARE WHEN HE 
22 COULD HAVE PROVIDED THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAITLIN 
23 DURING THE FIRST TWO YEARS AND NINE MONTHS OF THE MARRIED 
24 LIFE. FROM THE TIME OF SEPARATION, APRIL 1992, TO THE 
25 PRESENT, THE COURT FINDS THAT BOTH PARTIES HAVE BEEN 
1 EXERCISING PRIMARY CARE AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAITLIN. 
2 IN FACT, THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE COURT INDICATES 
3 THAT BOTH PARTIES HAVE BEEN DOING AN EXCELLENT JOB IN 
4 PROVIDING FOR HER BASIC CARE AND NEEDS DURING THIS TIME; 
5 HER HYGIENE, FEEDING, THOSE CARE. THAT THERE'S NO BASIS 
6 TO SAY THAT ONE PARTY HAS MORE PRIMARY CUSTODIAL 
7 RESPONSIBILITY OR BONDS FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS AND THREE 
8 MONTHS. THAT BOTH PARTIES UNDER THE SPLIT CUSTODY 
9 ARRANGEMENT HAVE BEEN PROVIDING PRIMARY CARE AND 
10 RESPONSIBILITY TO CAITLIN. 
11 AS TO THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE PARENTAL 
12 BONDS — AND I THINK THIS IS AN ISSUE THAT MAY BE ONE OF 
13 THE DIFFERENTIATING ISSUES IN THIS CASE — BUT THE COURT 
14 FINDS THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE. THAT 
15 INITIALLY DURING THE FIRST TIME WHERE FRAN BARGAR 
16 PROVIDED THE PRIMARY CARE, SHE MAY HAVE HAD A RELATIVE 
17 GREATER STRENGTH AND PARENTAL BOND. BUT OVER THE LAST 
18 TWO YEARS AND TWO MONTHS, AND PARTICULARLY AS REPORTED BY 
19 DR. MCMANEMIN INDICATED IN HER PROFESSIONAL OPINION THAT 
20 MR. BARGAR HAS A STRONGER BOND AND CAITLIN HAS A STRONGER 
21 BOND WITH MR. BARGAR AT THIS TIME THAN SHE DOES WITH MRS. 
22 BARGAR. THAT IT WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL IF THAT BOND WITH 
23 MR. BARGAR WAS REDUCED OR WEAKENED IN ANY WAY, ALTHOUGH 
24 SHE INDICATED THAT THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT THERE WAS 
25 A STRONG BOND WITH BOTH PARENTS AND A REQUIREMENT THAT 
1 SUBSTANTIAL TIME BE SPENT WITH BOTH PARENTS. KIM 
2 PETERSON, IN HIS SUMMARY AND REPORT TO THE COURT, 
3 INDICATED AGAIN AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION, AND I THINK OF 
4 SIGNIFICANCE WITH MR- PETERSON'S REPORT, INDICATED THAT 
5 ALMOST ALL THE EVIDENCE THAT THE COURT HAS HEARD IN THE 
6 LAST TWO DAYS WAS SUPPLIED TO MR. PETERSON BY WAY OF 
7 LETTERS, EXHIBITS AND RESPONSES. THE COURT I THINK 
8 SPECIFICALLY NEEDS TO NOTE FOR THE RECORD THAT THE 
9 PARTIES HAD THE OPPORTUNITY AND IN FACT DID, IN THE 
10 EXHIBIT PROVIDED TO KIM PETERSON, TO REFUTE CERTAIN 
11 STATEMENTS THAT WERE MADE IN THE EXHIBITS AND EXPLAIN WHY 
12 SOMETHING THAT WAS SET FORTH IN THE EXHIBIT DID OR DIDN'T 
13 HAPPEN. SO THAT MR. PETERSON, IN MAKING HIS EVALUATION, 
14 HAD EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND TO DETERMINE AND WAS ABLE TO 
15 REVIEW THE MATERIAL THAT WAS PRESENTED TO THE COURT WITH 
16 THE EXPLANATIONS OR REFUTING THE MATERIAL THAT WAS 
17 RAISED. AND SO THE COURT BELIEVES THAT HE HAS HEARD AND 
18 REVIEWED AND IS AWARE OF ALMOST ALL OF THE EVIDENCE THAT 
19 WAS PRESENTED TO THE COURT. 
20 AND FROM THIS, MR. PETERSON INDICATES THAT 
21 CAITI PRESENTS AS MORE BONDED TO HER FATHER; WHEREAS, 
22 DURING PREVIOUS INTERVIEWS OR STATEMENTS WERE LESS 
23 DEFINITE AS TO THE ISSUE OF RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THE 
24 PARENTAL BOND. KIM PETERSON FINDS THAT SHE IS MORE 
25 BONDED AT THIS TIME TO HER FATHER. DR. EMPEY INDICATED 
1 THAT THERE WAS A VERY STRONG BOND WITH FRANCES BARGAR. 
2 HIS TESTIMONY INDICATED THAT HE DIDN'T MEET WITH MR. 
3 BARGAR AND COULDN'T COMMENT ON HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH MR. 
4 BARGAR, SO COULDN'T OFFER ANY PROFESSIONAL OPINION OR 
5 WEIGH OR MEASURE THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE BOND. HE 
6 DID TESTIFY THAT THERE WAS A VERY STRONG BOND WITH MRS. 
7 BARGAR. 
8 RELATIVE ABILITIES OF THE PARENTS TO PROVIDE 
9 CARE, SUPERVISION AND A SUITABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE 
10 CHILDREN, AGAIN, I THINK JOHANNA MCMANEMIN'S TESTIMONY 
11 MAY BE MOST RELEVANT TO THE COURT, INDICATED THAT BOTH 
12 PARTIES IN TERMS OF PROVIDING CARE, SUPERVISION AND 
13 SUITABLE ENVIRONMENT COULD PROVIDE MORE CARE, COULD 
14 PROVIDE PROPER SUPERVISION AND SUITABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR 
15 THE CHILDREN. AND I THINK THAT TESTIMONY WAS THE SAME AS 
16 KIM PETERSON'S AND THE TESTIMONY OF THE PARTIES THAT THE 
17 COURT HAS RECEIVED THAT BOTH PARTIES CAN PROVIDE CARE, 
18 SUPERVISION AND A SUITABLE ENVIRONMENT. AND SO IN THAT 
19 REGARD, THE COURT DOES NOT FIND THAT THERE ARE ANY ISSUES 
20 ABOUT BASIC CARE, SUPERVISION AND ENVIRONMENT. 
21 THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ISSUES RAISED AND I 
22 THINK THE COURT NEEDS TO COMMENT ABOUT THOSE IN RELATION 
23 TO SUITABLE ENVIRONMENT OF THE CHILD. THE FIRST IS THE 
24 ISSUE OF SECONDHAND SMOKE IN THE CURRENT RESIDENCE FROM 
25 MRS. BARGAR, THE MOTHER OF THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE. 
1 THE COURT WOULD FIND, AFTER LISTENING TO THE EVIDENCE IN 
2 THIS CASE, THAT MRS. BARGAR HAS QUIT SMOKING; HAS NOT 
3 SMOKED SINCE 1990. THAT THIS IS AN ISSUE OF CONCERN TO 
4 THE COURT. THE COURT DOES NOT FIND, HOWEVER, THAT'S AN 
5 ISSUE OR AT THE PRESENT TIME NO ONE IN THE HOME IS 
6 SMOKING AND THAT THE CHILD IS NOT EXPOSED TO SECONDHAND 
7 SMOKE. SO THAT IS NOT AN ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. 
8 THERE WAS AN ISSUE RAISED OF MR. BARGAR'S PAST 
9 DRINKING AND CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL AROUND CHILDREN TO 
10 THE POINT OF INTOXICATION AS A MAJOR ISSUE. AND I THINK 
11 IT WOULD AFFECT THE SUITABLE ENVIRONMENT OF THE CHILD. 
12 HOWEVER, THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT AND THAT THE COURT 
13 FINDS THAT MR. BARGAR HAS BEEN IN ABSTINENCE FROM 
14 DRINKING IN EXCESS OF THE PAST YEAR. THAT DURING THAT 
15 TIME HE HAS BECOME A CONVERT TO THE LDS CHURCH AND HAS 
16 OBVIOUS ABSTINENCE FROM ALL ALCOHOL. THEREFORE, THE 
17 CURRENT SITUATION FOR EVALUATION, THE COURT, WHILE THERE 
18 IS A RECORD OF PAST DRINKING, AND THE COURT WOULD FIND 
19 THE EVIDENCE WOULD INDICATE THAT THAT DRINKING HAS BEEN 
20 TO THE POINT OF INTOXICATION ON OCCASION. THAT THAT 
21 ISSUE IS NOT ONE BEFORE THE COURT IN WEIGHING TO 
22 DETERMINE THE CURRENT SUITABILITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT FOR 
23 THE CHILD. 
24 THERE'S THE ISSUE THAT WAS RAISED FROM FRAN 
25 BARGAR'S INAPPROPRIATE CONTROL IN DISCIPLINING HER CHILD. 
1 ON OCCASIONS OF GRABBING HER, SPANKING HER TO THE 
2 POINT — THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE 
3 BEFORE THE COURT THAT FRAN BARGAR HAS BEEN EXCESSIVE IN 
4 GRABBING THE CHILD. HOWEVER, THE COURT FINDS THAT THIS 
5 HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY EXAGGERATED AND DEALT WITH AS AN 
6 ABUSE SITUATION WHEN IT MAY BE A MATTER OF JUST A 
7 JUDGMENT SITUATION DEALING WITH A YOUNG GIRL AND BEING 
8 DISCIPLINED AND IT DOESN'T RAISE TO THE LEVEL OF MAKING 
9 HER UNFIT IN ANY WAY FOR THE CARE, SUPERVISION OR 
10 PROVIDING A SUITABLE ENVIRONMENT. FOR THE COURT, IT WOULD 
11 INDICATE TO THE COURT THAT IT IS AN AREA THAT COUNSELLING 
12 OR WORK BY MRS. BARGAR WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN LEARNING 
13 SKILLS TO DEAL WITH DISCIPLINING OF THE CHILD. 
14 THE COURT FINDS ALSO THAT THERE HAVE BEEN 
15 ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THIS COURT, AND I THINK IT WAS 
16 BEFORE THE COURT PREVIOUSLY, AS TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF 
17 THE PLAINTIFF WITH TODD SMITH PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE, 
18 PREGNANCY AND CONDUCT WITH CAITLIN PRESENT. THE COURT 
19 FINDS THAT THERE'S NOT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT 
20 INDICATES IN ANY WAY THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND MR. SMITH 
21 WERE IN BED TOGETHER WITH CAITLIN WITHOUT CLOTHES ON OR 
22 ANY INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT IN THAT MATTER. THE COURT 
23 FINDS THAT AS TO ABUSE THAT THERE ISN'T SUFFICIENT 
24 EVIDENCE AND SO THE COURT WOULD NOT FIND THAT THAT 
25 CONDUCT TOOK PLACE. THERE'S NOT SUFFICIENT FINDING TO 
1 FIND THAT THAT CONDUCT TOOK PLACE. HOWEVER, THE COURT 
2 DOES FIND THAT IN THE ISSUE OF MORALS ISSUES THAT 
3 PROBABLY ONE OF STRONGEST ISSUES IS OF EXAMPLE AND THE 
4 ISSUE OF BECOMING PREGNANT OUT OF WEDLOCK PRIOR TO THE 
5 DIVORCE BEING FINALIZED. AND A NUMBER OF THOSE ISSUES 
6 ARE ISSUES THAT RAISE SOME CONCERN TO THE COURT AS FAR AS 
7 SUITABLE ENVIRONMENT, ALTHOUGH NOT TO THE LEVEL TO CREATE 
8 ANY PROBLEM THAT WOULD PREVENT HER FROM HAVING THE CHILD 
9 IN THIS CASE. HERE HAVE BEEN ISSUES RAISED AS TO THE 
10 INCOME AND PHYSICAL ABILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF TO PROVIDE 
11 AND CARE FOR CAITLIN WITH BUSINESS. THE COURT WOULD 
12 FIND SPECIFICALLY AS FAR AS INCOME IS CONCERNED, THAT THE 
13 PLAINTIFF HAS WITH HER NEW — WITH TODD SMITH AND THEIR 
14 INCOME, HAS BETTER ABILITY TO PROVIDE FOR THE PHYSICAL 
15 NEEDS OF THE PARTIES. HOWEVER, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
16 PLAINTIFF IS ABLE TO GENERATE SUFFICIENT INCOME THAT HE 
17 DOESN'T HAVE EXCEPTIONAL EXPENSES IN LIVING WITH HIS 
18 MOTHER AND CAN PROVIDE A SUITABLE AND QUALITY HOME FOR 
19 HER AT THIS TIME AS WELL AS THE PLAINTIFF. 
20 MR. BEAN: YOUR HONOR, YOU ARE USING THE WORD 
21 "PLAINTIFF" IN REGARDS TO MR. BARGAR. 
22 THE COURT: I'LL REFER TO MR. BARGAR, AS MR. 
23 BARGAR THROUGH LIVING WITH HIS MOTHER DOES HAVE 
24 SUFFICIENT INCOME AND ACTUALLY NOT APPEARS TO BE SOME 
25 EXPENSES THAT HE'S ABLE TO PROVIDE A SUITABLE CARE. I 
1 THINK THE PICTURES, THE ENVIRONMENT SHOWS THEIR HOME, 
2 BEDROOM AND EVERYTHING SHOWS AN EXCELLENT ~ AT LEAST TO 
3 THE COURT — AN EXCELLENT ENVIRONMENT. ALSO THE ABILITY 
4 TO PROVIDE CARE, SUPERVISION AND A SUITABLE ENVIRONMENT. 
5 THE COURT SPECIFICALLY FINDS THAT THE TRAINING THAT MR. 
6 BARGAR HAS RECEIVED IN HIS PARENTING CLASSES APPEAR TO 
7 HAVE BEEN — TO HAVE GIVEN HIM SIGNIFICANT SKILLS AND 
8 ABILITIES TO BETTER DEAL WITH THE ISSUES IN THE CARE AND 
9 SUPERVISION OF CATEY AT THIS TIME. 
10 AS TO THE CHARACTER AND EMOTIONAL STABILITY OF 
11 THE PARENTS IN THIS CASE, THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE WERE 
12 A NUMBER OF CLAIMS MADE. DESPITE THESE CLAIMS, THE COURT 
13 FINDS THAT OVERALL BOTH PARENTS ARE GOOD PEOPLE AND WOULD 
14 MAKE GOOD PARENTS FOR CATEY IN THIS SITUATION. HOWEVER, 
15 THERE ARE A FEW CONCERNS FOR THE RECORD I THINK THE COURT 
16 NEEDS TO NOTE. FOR MR. BARGAR, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
17 EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT MR. BARGAR, IN THE COURT'S OPINION 
18 LISTENING TO THE EVIDENCE, HAS EXERCISED POOR JUDGMENT 
19 RELATING TO CAITLIN IN DEALING WITH ISSUES OF ABUSE. 
20 THAT HOW THIS WAS HANDLED IN TAKING CAITLIN TO THE 
21 POLICE, HOW THE INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED AND WITH A 
22 PSYCHOLOGIST RATHER THAN DEALING WITH THE OTHER PARTY I 
23 THINK IS PROBABLY AN EXAMPLE OF POOR COMMUNICATION 
24 PROCESS. BUT IT'S PUT CAITLIN THROUGH A PROCESS THAT THE 
25 COURT FEELS HAS BEEN DETRIMENTAL TO HER INTERESTS TO HAVE 
1 TO GO THROUGH THIS WITHOUT HAVING MORE SUBSTANTIATION OF 
2 THE ISSUES. AND THAT HAS BEEN VERY POOR JUDGMENT ON HIS 
3 PART IN DEALING WITH THIS. 
4 THERE HAVE BEEN ISSUES RAISED OF A DRINKING 
5 PROBLEM AND THE COURT FINDS THAT HISTORICALLY THE 
6 DRINKING WAS OF SOME CONCERN. BUT I THINK THOSE ISSUES 
7 HAVE BEEN RESOLVED IN THE CONDUCT AND DECISIONS THAT MR. 
8 BARGAR HAS MADE. THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE'S SOME 
9 CONCERN IN THE WORK SITUATION, BUT WHERE HE'S 
10 SELF-EMPLOYED, IT'S BEEN OVER AN APPROXIMATELY 15 YEARS 
11 IN THE BUSINESS THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE'S SUFFICIENT 
12 STABILITY WITH THIS AND THE WATER JOB IN THIS CASE. THE 
13 COURT FINDS ALSO THAT IT WAS RAISED — ISSUES HAVE BEEN 
14 RAISED ABOUT THE DEPENDENCE ON HIS — HER FOR PROVIDING 
15 MANY OF CAITLIN'S NEEDS. THE COURT FINDS THAT HIS MOTHER 
16 DOES PROVIDE SOME OF CAITLIN'S NEEDS, BUT THAT IT'S A 
17 POSITIVE ENVIRONMENT IN THE HOME AND IT 
18 BENEFITS — THE PRIMARY NEEDS OF CAITLIN WHEN CAITLIN HAS 
19 BEEN IN MR. BARGAR'S CUSTODY HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY MR. 
20 BARGAR. THERE HAVE BEEN ISSUES RAISED ABOUT LOADED GUNS 
21 AND THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF GUNS IN THE HOME. IF THEY 
22 HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIATED, THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT IS A 
23 SIGNIFICANT CHARACTER PROBLEM IF A PARENT WOULD LEAVE 
24 LOADED GUNS OR PISTOLS WHERE THEY ARE ACCESSIBLE TO SMALL 
25 CHILDREN. THAT'S SOMETHING THAT WOULD EXHIBIT A HIGH 
1 LACK OF JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN 
2 THIS CASE WOULD INDICATE THAT IT HAS NOT BE SUBSTANTIATED 
3 AND THE COURT DOES NOT FIND THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY 
4 PROBLEM WITH LOADED GUNS IN THE HOME OR BEDROOM IN THIS 
5 CASE. 
6 AS TO THE PLAINTIFF, FRAN BARGAR, THE 
7 FOLLOWING ISSUES HAVE BEEN RAISED AND THE COURT FINDS 
8 THAT MRS. BARGAR HAS ALSO EXHIBITED POOR JUDGMENT AND 
9 CHARACTER IN HOW CAITLIN HAS BEEN HANDLED IN SEVERAL 
10 AREAS DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS. FIRST IN THE LACK OF 
11 COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES. THE TESTIMONY OF DR. 
12 EMPEY WOULD INDICATE TO THE COURT THAT MRS. BARGAR WAS 
13 AWARE THAT DR. MCMANEMIN DID CONTACT HER AND WAS 
14 AVAILABLE FOR COUNSELLING AND CHOSE NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN 
15 COUNSELLING WITH DR. MCMANEMIN. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN 
16 EVIDENCE, AND I THINK IT WAS PARTICULARLY MENTIONED AND I 
17 THINK THAT THE COURT FINDS GREATEST EMPHASIS OF THIS AND 
18 THE WEIGHT OF THIS IN DR. EMPEY'S TESTIMONY WHEN HE 
19 INDICATED IN HIS TESTIMONY THAT HE FELT INITIALLY AND I 
20 THINK FOR SOMETIME IN THE PROCESS, THAT MRS. BARGAR'S 
21 PRIMARY CONCERN IN SEEKING COUNSELLING FOR CAITLIN IN 
22 THIS CASE WAS TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF THE DIVORCE AND 
23 NOT PRIMARILY DEALING WITH THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
24 CAITLINN. AND I THINK THIS WAS PARTICULARLY SHOWN IN 
25 THE FACT THAT THESE SESSIONS WERE NOT PURSUED FOR A 
1 PERIOD OF OVER SIX MONTHS WHEN DR. EMPEY RECOMMENDED THAT 
2 THEY BE PURSUED AND THAT THEY WERE INSTITUTED AGAIN JUST 
3 PRIOR TO THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING. THAT WOULD INDICATE TO 
4 THE COURT, BASED ON HIS TESTIMONY AND BASED ON HER 
5 CONTACT OR NON-CONTACT WITH DR. MCMANEMIN, THAT THERE 
6 WASN'T A SINCERE INTEREST IN WORKING IN CAIT'S BEST 
7 INTERESTS AS DEALING WITH THE ISSUES IN THE DIVORCE. 
8 THE ABUSE ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED, THE 
9 COURT BELIEVES THAT THEY HAVE BEEN REALLY DRUMMED UP AND 
10 ARE NOT ISSUES OF ABUSE. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME LACK 
11 OF JUDGMENT AND MAYBE NOT APPROPRIATELY HANDLING 
12 DISCIPLINE, BUT I DON'T THINK THERE HAS BEEN ANY FACT 
13 THAT WOULD PROPOSE ABUSE OR EVEN TO PUT CAITLIN THROUGH 
14 THIS HAS BEEN I THINK A FAR MORE SERIOUS ABUSE AND LACK 
15 OF JUDGMENT THAN ANY OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE ABUSE 
16 ISSUE. THE COMMITMENT TO THE PROPOSED CUSTODIAN OF 
17 PROVIDING PARENTING AND ALSO PROVIDING FOR THE NEEDS OF 
18 THE CHILD AND PROVIDING FOR THE OTHER PARTIES' NEEDS, THE 
19 COURT IN THIS CASE FINDS DR. EMPEY'S TESTIMONY CARRIED 
20 MAJOR WEIGHT FOR THE COURT IN MAKING A FINDING IN WHICH 
21 DR. EMPEY, AS I STATED BEFORE, WAS CONCERNED IN TREATMENT 
22 THAT FRAN WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH DIVORCE AND CUSTODY 
23 ISSUES RATHER THAN THE INDIVIDUAL NEEDS OF CAITLIN. AND 
24 THAT BECOMES PARTICULARLY OF CONCERN WITH THE COURT WHEN, 
25 AS PART OF THE TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE, THERE WAS NOT 
1 FURTHER OR ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY ABOUT THE PLAINTIFF'S 
2 RELATION WITH CAITLIN. THEIR RELATION WHERE THAT WAS NOT 
3 RAISED EVEN IN THE TREATMENT, BUT NOT EVEN IN THE CASE 
4 THAT WE'VE HAD BEFORE US. HE TESTIFIED THAT THE 
5 SESSIONS WERE GEARED TO RESPOND TO THE REPORTS TO 
6 REHABILITATE HER OR DISCREDIT MR. BARGAR, EVEN REASONS 
7 FOR ALLEGATIONS THAT WERE MADE. HE WAS PARTICULARLY 
8 CONCERNED WITH THE BREAK FROM OCTOBER TO APRIL WHEN 
9 TREATMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN BENEFICIAL TO CAITLIN AND FELT 
10 STRONGLY THAT MRS. BARGAR NEEDED TO SEPARATE HER ANGER AT 
11 BOB FROM HER RELATIONSHIP WITH CAITLIN. AND THAT'S AN 
12 ISSUE THAT I DON'T THINK SHE HAS COPED WITH FULLY AT THIS 
13 TIME. 
14 ALSO THE COURT IS CONCERNED IN LOOKING AT MR. 
15 BARGAR'S PRIOR CONDUCT AND CURRENT CONDUCT THAT THE COURT 
16 DOES HAVE SOME CONCERN THAT THE BASIS OF HIS INCREASED 
17 INTEREST AND MOTIVATION TO PROVIDE THESE THINGS TO 
18 CAITLIN, WAS MOTIVATED IN PART TO RETALIATE OR GET BACK 
19 AT MRS. BARGAR RATHER THAN TOTALLY FOR CAITLIN'S BEST 
20 INTERESTS. I THINK IF THE PARTIES ARE HONEST, THAT IS 
21 THE MOTIVATING FACTOR IN SITUATIONS WITH THAT. HOWEVER, 
22 THE COURT FINDS THAT WE HAVE A SITUATION HERE WHERE 
23 THERE'S BEEN TWO YEARS WHEN THERE HAVE BEEN MOTIVATION 
24 AND THAT WOULD INDICATE TO THE COURT THAT THAT BEHAVIOR 
25 IS GOING TO CONTINUE WHERE THERE HAS BEEN BEHAVIOR NOW 
1 FOR A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS. THE COURT ALSO FINDS, 
2 PARTICULARLY IN THE COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE FOR THE OTHER 
3 PARENT, THAT THE NATURE OF THIS WOULD INDICATE THAT MR. 
4 BARGAR IS MORE WILLING TO PROVIDE VISITATION, MORE 
5 WILLING TO TRY TO PROVIDE FOR MEDIATION AND MORE WILLING 
6 TO TRY TO PROVIDE FOR A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP. TESTIMONY 
7 INDICATES THAT THERE HAS BEEN MORE NEGATIVE THINGS SAID 
8 BY MRS. BARGAR IN RELATION TO THESE COUNSELLING SESSIONS 
9 THAN HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY MR. BARGAR. THE COURT FINDS 
10 THAT, BASED ON EVIDENCE, THAT HE'S MORE COMMITTED TO 
11 MEDIATION AND RESOLVING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
12 WITH THOSE FINDINGS AS A BASIS FOR THE COURT 
13 MAKING A DECISION, THE COURT WOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING 
14 ORDERS IN THIS CASE. THAT THE PARTIES — THAT THE 
15 CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES — THAT PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT 
16 ARE AWARDED THE JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY SUBJECT TO THE 
17 FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS. THAT THE DEFENDANT, 
18 ROBERT BARGAR, IS AWARDED PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF CAITLIN. 
19 THAT THERE'S GOING TO BE SUBSTANTIAL LIBERAL VISITATION 
20 AS FOLLOWS: THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS AWARDED VISITATION 
21 EVERY OTHER WEEKEND AND THE WEEKEND THAT SHE WILL HAVE 
22 THE CHILD IS THE WEEKEND THAT SHE HAS THE FRIDAY OFF. SO 
23 THE EVERY OTHER WEEKEND WOULD BE ANY AND SHE WOULD HAVE 
24 THE CHILD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON FRIDAY. IF SHE IS IN 
25 SCHOOL AND SHE GETS OUT OF SCHOOL, AS SOON AS SCHOOL IS 
1 OUT ON FRIDAY. AND IF YOU ARE IN KINDERGARTEN, I THINK 
2 THAT MAYBE AT NOON ON FRIDAY THAT VISITATION WOULD BE 
3 POSSIBLE. 
4 MR. BEAN: ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT FRIDAY OR 
5 THURSDAY, YOUR HONOR? 
6 THE COURT: I'M TALKING ABOUT FRIDAY BECAUSE 
7 IF SHE IS IN KINDERGARTEN — IF SHE'S NOT IN SCHOOL, THEN 
8 IT WOULD BEGIN THURSDAY EVENING. IF SHE IS IN SCHOOL, IT 
9 WOULD BE AFTER SHE — AS SOON AS SHE FINISHES SCHOOL. IN 
10 ADDITION, THE COURT WOULD AWARD TO THE PLAINTIFF TWO 
11 MONTHS CUSTODIAL VISITATION DURING THE SUMMER. AND SO 
12 THERE WOULD BE CONTINUOUS TWO MONTHS DURING SUMMER 
13 VACATION IN WHICH — RATHER THAN THE SIX WEEKS 
14 ALTERNATING, THAT THE PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE CUSTODY OF 
15 CAITLIN ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS AND VISITATION WOULD THEN 
16 BE PROVIDED FOR MR. BARGAR. AND SO — AND I THINK IT 
17 WILL DEPEND IF SHE IS IN YEAR-ROUND SCHOOL OR HOW THE 
18 SCHEDULES WORK OUT, BUT IT WOULD PROBABLY PROXIMATE FROM 
19 THE TIME OF JUNE 15 TO AUGUST 15, THE CONTINUOUS 
20 TWO-MONTH PERIOD OF TIME WHEN CAITLIN WILL RESIDE WITH 
21 THE PLAINTIFF AND THAT VISITATION RIGHT WOULD THEN REVERT 
22 TO MR. BARGAR DURING THIS TIME. 
23 THAT DURING THIS SUMMER, BEFORE THIS BEGINS, 
24 THE COURT WOULD AWARD CAITLIN TO MRS. BARGAR DURING THE 
25 MONTH OF JULY AND THAT MR. BARGAR WOULD HAVE HER DURING 
1 THE MONTH OF AUGUST AND THEN RETAIN HER DURING THE SCHOOL 
2 YEAR WHICH WOULD BEGIN AT THE END OF AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER 
3 UNTIL THE NEXT SUMMER VACATION. THERE WOULD ALSO BE 
4 LIBERAL VISITATION IN THAT IN ADDITION TO EVERY OTHER 
5 WEEKEND THAT WEEKS NOT GOING HE TAKES TWO EVENINGS A 
6 WEEK, TUESDAY AND THURSDAY EVENINGS, AS WEEKLY VISITATION 
7 RATHER THAN JUST THE WEEKEND VISITATION. SO AN EXTRA DAY 
8 FOR THE WEEKDAY VISITATION. IN ADDITION TO THIS, IF THE 
9 PARTIES AGREE AND THE PARTIES — AND THE COURT HOPES 
10 THAT THEY DO IN THE PROCESS OF COUNSELLING AND EVERYTHING 
11 ELSE FOR ADDITIONAL TIME, THAT THERE'S NOTHING TO PREVENT 
12 THERE BEING AN ADDITIONAL TIME WITH THIS. ALSO, EACH 
13 PARTY IS TO HAVE TWO WEEKS OF UNINTERRUPTED VISITATION 
14 DURING THE SUMMER VISITATION OR SUMMER VACATION DURING 
15 THE PERIOD THAT THEY HAVE CUSTODY. SO YOU NEED TO UNLESS 
16 YOU AGREE OTHERWISE. SO IF DURING THE TWO MONTHS THAT 
17 YOU HAVE THE CHILD IN THE SUMMER, TWO WEEKS OF THAT YOU 
18 CAN HAVE WITHOUT WEEKEND VISITATION OR ANYTHING ELSE. 
19 IT'S UNINTERRUPTED VACATION TIME, IF YOU TAKE VACATION. 
20 IF YOU ARE GONE AND TAKE VACATION OR UNINTERRUPTED TIME, 
21 AND MR. BARGAR NEEDS TO PLAN THAT UNINTERRUPTED TIME 
22 DURING THE TIME OUTSIDE OF THE TWO MONTHS WHEN HE WOULD 
23 HAVE VACATION WITH THE CHILD. THE HOLIDAYS, THERE WOULD 
24 BE ALTERNATE HOLIDAYS SUBJECT TO THE STATE SCHEDULE. SO 
25 THAT WOULD BE THE HOLIDAY WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE STATE 
1 SCHEDULE. THE COURT WOULD ALSO REQUIRE THAT THERE BE 
2 COUNSELLING WITH DR. JOHANNA MCMANEMIN AND THAT SHE WOULD 
3 SET UP A SCHEDULE THAT BOTH PARENTS WOULD PARTICIPATE. I 
4 THINK THAT WOULD INITIALLY INVOLVE THE PARTIES 
5 INDIVIDUALLY WITH CAITLIN. THERE MAY BE AT LEAST ONE OR 
6 TWO SESSIONS, AS DR. MCMANEMIN FEELS IS APPROPRIATE, FOR 
7 MR. AND MRS. BARGAR TO DEAL WITH ISSUES OF WORKING WITH 
8 CAITLIN SO THAT THEY CAN WORK OUT MUTUALLY BETWEEN THEM 
9 ISSUES OF DISCIPLINE AND HOW TO HANDLE THINGS SO SHE IS 
10 HANDLED AND TREATED THE SAME IN BOTH HOMES. THERE COMES 
11 A RESOLUTION WHERE BOTH PARTIES HAVE INPUT AND BOTH 
12 PARTIES CAN REACH A MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON HOW TO DEAL WITH 
13 ISSUES OF DISCIPLINE, SCHOOL AND WHERE THEY ARE GOING TO 
14 HAVE JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY, YOU ARE BOTH GOING TO BE 
15 INVOLVED AND SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN DECISIONS OF WHERE SHE 
16 GOES TO SCHOOL, SUBJECTS, ALL OF THOSE KINDS OF THINGS. 
17 AND THE PROCESS OF THIS IS TO HELP THE PARTIES MEDIATE OR 
18 WORK OUT A NUMBER OF THESE ISSUES. 
19 IN ADDITION, THE CHILD SUPPORT. THE COURT HAS 
20 DETERMINED THAT PURSUANT TO THE CURRENT CHILD SUPPORT 
21 SCHEDULE, THAT CHILD SUPPORT ON THE BASIS OF THE INCOME 
22 OF $1,500 A MONTH, WOULD BE $388. EACH PARTY WOULD PAY 
23 50 PERCENT AND A HALF OR $194. THEREFORE, DURING THAT 
24 APPROXIMATELY 10 MONTHS THAT THE CHILD IS IN CUSTODY OF 
25 MR. BARGAR, THE PLAINTIFF WOULD PAY CHILD SUPPORT IN THE 
1 AMOUNT OF $194 LESS ONE-HALF OF THE MEDICAL EXPENSES FOR 
2 THE MEDICAL INSURANCE. SO THERE WASN'T TESTIMONY, I 
3 THINK THE PARTIES CAN GET THAT AMOUNT OF THAT PERCENT OF 
4 HER INSURANCE THAT IS FOR CAITLIN AND SHE WOULD DEDUCT 
5 THAT FROM THE $194 DURING THE TWO MONTHS THAT THE CHILD 
6 IS IN CUSTODY OF — CONTINUOUS CUSTODY OF MRS. BARGAR, 
7 MR. BARGAR WOULD PAY CHILD SUPPORT IN THE AMOUNT OF $194. 
8 AND SO IF YOU BALANCED IT OUT, IT WOULD REALLY BE EIGHT 
9 MONTHS OF $194 LESS ONE-HALF THE MEDICAL INSURANCE FOR 
10 TWELVE MONTHS THEN. AND SO IT MAY BE BETTER TO PRO-RATE 
11 THAT OVER THE FULL YEAR, BUT I THINK THAT'S A 
12 MATHEMATICAL CALCULATION THAT THE PARTIES CAN DO. 
13 ALSO, THAT DURING THE WEEKEND VISITATION, THE 
14 COURT FINDS THAT IF CAITLIN IS ATTENDING CHURCH IN THE 
15 KAYSVILLE 15TH WARD AT THIS TIME, THAT WOULD BE 
16 APPROPRIATE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HER TO ATTEND THAT 
17 WARD ON A REGULAR BASIS. AND SO IF THE CHILD CAN EVEN BE 
18 BROUGHT BACK UNLESS THEY ARE OUT OF TOWN, TO ATTEND THAT 
19 WARD SO THERE'S A REGULAR CONTINUOUS SENSE FOR THE TWO 
20 MONTHS WHEN IT'S SWITCHED. THE COURT FEELS THAT IT'S 
21 APPROPRIATE THAT CHILD ATTEND ONE WARD OR CHURCH ON AS 
22 MUCH A BASIS AS POSSIBLE. 
23 MR. BEAN: WHEN YOU ARE THROUGH, CAN I SPEAK 
24 TO THAT ISSUE, YOUR HONOR? 
25 THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
1 AS TO PERSONAL PROPERTY, THE COURT WOULD AWARD 
2 PREVIOUS PROPERTY AS IT'S CURRENTLY DISTRIBUTED WITH THE 
3 FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS: THAT A COPY OF PICTURES AND VIDEOS 
4 BE MADE AND THAT EACH PARTY PAY ONE-HALF THE COST. IF 
5 THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT WANT A CERTAIN PICTURE, THEN IF 
6 YOU CAN'T GIVE THAT TO HIM, THERE'S ONLY GOING TO BE ONE-
7 HALF THE COST OF THOSE PICTURES THAT BOTH PARTIES WANT A 
8 COPY OF. SO THERE'S NO QUESTION, THEN THE PICTURES CAN 
9 BE TURNED OVER TO THE DEFENDANT. BUT IF THERE'S ANY 
10 QUESTION AS TO THOSE YOU BOTH WANT THEM, THEY BE MADE AND 
11 EACH WOULD PAY ONE-HALF THE COST. 
12 THE PLAINTIFF IS ORDERED TO MAINTAIN CAITLIN 
13 AS A DEPENDENT ON HER PRESENT HEALTH, ACCIDENT AND 
14 HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE. THE COURT WOULD FIND, BASED 
15 ON EVIDENCE, THAT THE PARTIES ARE NOT ORDERED TO MAINTAIN 
16 LIFE INSURANCE IN THIS CASE. EACH PARTY IS RESPONSIBLE 
17 TO ASSUME THEIR OWN DEBTS. THERE HAVE BEEN NONE 
18 PRESENTED, BUT IF THERE ARE DEBTS, JUST FOR THE RECORD 
19 AND FINAL DECREE, THAT EACH OF YOU BE RESPONSIBLE THEN 
20 FOR THEIR OWN DEBTS. AT THIS TIME THE TAX EXEMPTION FOR 
21 CAITLIN IS AWARDED TO THE DEFENDANT. AND EACH PARTY IS 
22 TO PAY THEIR OWN ATTORNEYS FEES IN THIS ACTION. I THINK 
23 I'VE COVERED THE ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED. AND MR. 
24 BEAN, YOU WANT TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF CHURCH? 
25 MR. BEAN: YES. THE PROBLEM, YOUR HONOR, IS 
1 THAT WITH THE BLOCK SCHEDULE, IF THEY TAKE CAITLIN BACK 
2 TO THE 15TH WARD IN KAYSVILLE AND ARE GOING TO BE 
3 RESPONSIBLE, THAT MEANS THEY ALSO WILL HAVE TO ATTEND 
4 THAT BLOCK SESSION IN THE 15TH WARD IN KAYSVILLE RATHER 
5 THAN GOING TO THEIR OWN WARD. AND THAT BIFURCATES THEIR 
6 ABILITY TO DO LOTS OF THINGS IN THEIR OWN WARD. 
7 THE COURT: I THINK — WHAT I MEAN IF SHE IS 
8 GOING TO BE THERE, THEN ALLOW MR. BARGAR TO PICK HER UP 
9 TO TAKE HER TO CHURCH AND THEN RETURN HER SO THAT THEY 
10 CAN GO TO THEIR HOME WARD, WHETHER THIS IS — AND SHE CAN 
11 GO WITH HER. BUT FOR A CHILD, AS YOU GO UP AND THROUGH A 
12 PRELIMINARY AREA, THOSE KINDS OF ACTIVITIES, I THINK IT'S 
13 IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE — IF YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE HER 
14 BE IN ONE WARD ONE WEEK AND ANOTHER WARD ANOTHER WEEK, I 
15 DON'T THINK THAT IS A SUITABLE ARRANGEMENT, GIVEN THE 
16 ACTIVITIES AND THINGS THAT GO ON. I DON'T THINK SHE 
17 WOULD END UP AT HOME IN EITHER SITUATION. SO THAT'S ALL 
18 I'M SAYING. AND ARRANGEMENTS, I THINK IN THIS KIND OF 
19 CASE, SHOULD BE — WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR MR. BARGAR TO 
20 MAKE THE ARRANGEMENTS TO PICK HER UP AND RETURN HER AS 
21 SOON AS IT'S OVER. 
22 MR. BEAN: AND THAT MEANS ARRANGE THAT IF HE 
23 DOES PICK HER UP, THAT THAT'S THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH HE 
24 PICKS HER UP, SO TO TAKE HER TO CHURCH. FOR ANY 
25 OTHER — 
1 THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT, NOT OTHER PURPOSES 
2 OR ANYTHING ELSE. IT WOULD BE JUST TO CHURCH AND BACK 
3 AND THEN WHATEVER VISITATION WOULD GO. THE DIFFERENCE IS 
4 TWO WEEKS THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS OR TWO MONTHS DURING THE 
5 SUMMER, UNLESS IT WOULD BE THE REVERSE AND UNLESS THE 
6 PARTIES AGREE OTHERWISE, THAT SHE COULD HAVE ATTENDED A 
7 WARD THERE IN THOSE TWO MONTHS. 
8 MR. BEAN: AND WILL — JUST SO WE HAVE A — 
9 YOU THINK WILL IT BE MR. BARGAR'S RESPONSIBILITY TO GIVE 
10 NOTICE IF HE'S NOT GOING TO PICK HER UP ON A PARTICULAR 
11 SUNDAY? 
12 THE COURT: THAT'S CORRECT. 
13 MR. BEAN: AND IF HE DOESN'T PICK HER UP ON A 
14 PARTICULAR SUNDAY, I ASSUME THEY CAN TAKE HER TO THEIR 
15 WARD. 
16 THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT. 
17 MR. PETERSON: THREE ISSUES, YOUR HONOR, THAT 
18 I HAVE THAT YOU ADDRESSED HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE. 
19 YOU DIDN'T ADDRESS THE UNINSURED MEDICAL COSTS. I ASSUME 
20 YOU ARE GOING TO ORDER — 
21 THE COURT: EXCUSE ME. THAT ANY MEDICAL, 
22 DENTAL OR OTHER EXPENSES OF THE MINOR NOT COVERED BY 
23 INSURANCE IS TO BE PAID 50 PERCENT BY THE PLAINTIFF AND 
24 50 PERCENT BY THE DEFENDANT. 
25 MR. PETERSON: THEN IN THIS CASE, ANTICIPATING 
1 NEEDS TO COMMUNICATE AND OBVIOUSLY STARTING LIFE ANEW 
2 HERE, I'M REQUESTING AN ORDER THAT EACH PARTY KEEP THE 
3 OTHER ADVISED OF THEIR TELEPHONE AND ADDRESS AT ALL 
4 TIMES. 
5 THE COURT: YES. WHERE THEY HAVE JOINT 
6 CUSTODY, THAT'S ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL. IF THEY ARE GOING 
7 TO LEAVE WITH THE CHILD, BE GONE ON VACATION OUT OF 
8 STATE, THEY NEED TO PROVIDE WHERE THEY ARE GOING TO BE 
9 AND A NUMBER THEY CAN BE REACHED OUT OF STATE, IF THERE 
10 ARE ANY EMERGENCIES OR ANYTHING IF THEY ARE GOING TO BE 
11 GONE. IT'S PROBABLY IF THEY WANT TO BE INFORMED, I THINK 
12 WHERE THEY BOTH ARE JOINT CUSTODY, THEN BOTH — THAT ANY 
13 MEDICAL OR OTHER DECISIONS WHILE ON VACATION, THE OTHER 
14 PARTY BE NOTIFIED. 
15 MR. BEAN: IN THAT CONNECTION, YOUR HONOR, IF 
16 IN FACT THAT — AND I APPRECIATE THE COURT'S ORDER WHICH 
17 IS USUAL — BUT — AND WHETHER OR NOT MRS. BARGAR' S FEARS 
18 ARE REAL OR UNFOUNDED, MAY WE HAVE A PERMANENT INJUNCTION 
19 RESTRAINING MR. BARGAR FROM ANY HARM OR MOLESTATION OF 
20 MRS. BARGAR? 
21 MR. PETERSON: WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO A 
22 MUTUAL INJUNCTION AGAINST BOTH PARTIES. 
23 THE COURT: YES, IT WOULD BE A MUTUAL 
24 INJUNCTION. BUT IT IS THE COURT'S STRONG HOPE THAT 
25 THROUGH THE MEDIATION AND COUNSELLING SESSIONS WITH DR. 
1 MCMINIME THAT THE PARTIES LEARN HOW TO WORK TOGETHER. 
2 THAT'S THE ONLY THING THAT'S GOING TO BE IN CAITLINN'S 
3 BEST INTERESTS IN THE LONG-TERM AND THERE MAY BE FEARS 
4 THAT MAY BE JUSTIFIED; MAY NOT. BUT THEY ARE GOING TO 
5 HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH WITH HER BEST INTERESTS. 
6 MR. PETERSON: THANK YOU. 
7 THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE THEN BEFORE THE 
8 COURT? 
9 MR. PETERSON: I'M TO PREPARE THE ORDER? 
10 THE COURT: THEN SUBMIT TO MR. BEAN FOR HIS 
11 REVIEW PRIOR TO THE COURT'S SIGNATURE. 
12 AND FOR THE CHILD SUPPORT, WHERE EACH — I'M 
13 GOING TO HAVE THAT START IN SEPTEMBER BECAUSE THEY ARE 
14 EACH — WE'RE GOING TO HAVE A SPLIT. EACH IS GOING TO 
15 HAVE THEM FOR A MONTH, JUNE AND AUGUST, SO ANY CHILD 
16 SUPPORT WOULD NOT START UNTIL SEPTEMBER. 
17 MR. PETERSON: WE HAD AN INDICATION BEFORE 
18 COURT SOMETIME — NEVER MIND. PHYSICAL — YOU MADE AN 
19 ORDER PHYSICAL RESIDENCE WITH MR. BARGAR. THAT TAKES 
20 CARE OF THE QUESTION. 
21 MR. BEAN: I WAS TALKING. DID YOU DISCUSS 
22 WHAT THE NATURE IS GOING TO BE IN TERMS OF THIS ACTUAL 
23 PHYSICAL CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT? WHEN IS THAT GOING TO 
24 COMMENCE AND WHAT ARE WE — 
25 THE COURT: YES. WELL THE ARRANGEMENT IS 
1 GOING TO BE DURING THE MONTH OF JULY, A FULL MONTH THE 
2 CUSTODY, PHYSICAL CUSTODY, UNDER TERMS OF THE EXTENT OF 
3 THE VISITATION WILL BE WITH MRS. BARGAR'S VISITATION ON 
4 EVERY OTHER WEEK AND HOPEFULLY CAIT WILL BE WITH MR. 
5 BARGAR. IN AUGUST MR. BARGAR HAVE THE PHYSICAL CUSTODY 
6 AND VISITATION WITH MRS. BARGAR, ALTHOUGH I THINK WITH 
7 THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD THAT MAY BE THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO 
8 WORK OUT SOME WEEKS THERE. AND THE PHYSICAL CUSTODY FOR 
9 SCHOOL WILL START — I THINK SCHOOL STARTS THE END OF 
10 AUGUST. SO IT WILL START THE LAST COUPLE OF DAYS THE 
11 FIRST OF SEPTEMBER AND SUPPORT WILL START THE FIRST OF 
12 SEPTEMBER. 
13 MR. BEAN: WE'RE HERE ON THE 24TH OF JUNE. 
14 THE COURT: WHO'S WEEK IS IT? I DON'T KNOW. 
15 MR. BEAN: I DON'T KNOW. THAT'S WHY I'M 
16 ASKING. 
17 THE COURT: YOU HAVE HER THIS WEEK THROUGH 
18 SUNDAY? 
19 MR. BEAN: SHE HAS HER. 
20 THE COURT: THEN MR. BARGAR WILL HAVE HER 
21 THROUGH THE END OF JUNE. ON JULY 1ST YOU WOULD HAVE HER 
22 AGAIN UNLESS THAT HOLIDAY WEEKEND — WHO HAS HER 4TH OF 
23 JULY HOLIDAY WEEKEND? 
24 MR. BEAN: I DON'T KNOW. THAT IS — 
25 MR. PETERSON: ALWAYS HAVE HAD THE CHILD ON 
1 THAT WEEK. 
2 THE COURT: IF THAT'S THE CASE, THEN MRS. 
3 BARGAR WOULD START WITH THE CHILD ON THE 4TH OF JULY 
4 WEEKEND. 
5 MR. PETERSON: AND THAT WOULD START THE 
6 HOLIDAY VISITATION, I SUPPOSE. YOU IDENTIFIED ACTUALLY 
7 THE STATUTE WILL CONTROL THAT BECAUSE YOU SAID THE 
8 STATUTE CONTROLS. 
9 THE COURT: OKAY. 
10 MR. PETERSON: WE'LL JUST LOOK AT THE STATUTE 
11 TO DETERMINE. 
12 THE COURT: IF THERE'S ANY QUESTION DISPUTED 
13 WHEN, WE JUST START WITH MRS. BARGAR ON THE 4TH OF JULY 
14 AND WORK EVERYTHING FROM THERE. 
15 MR. PETERSON: NOW, TO JUST TO THROW A LITTLE 
16 FLY IN THIS OINTMENT. HE BELIEVES THAT KINDERGARTEN 
17 STARTS THE LAST DAY OF JULY. 
18 THE COURT: WELL, THAT'S A QUESTION I HAD, IF 
19 YOU ARE YEAR-ROUND SCHOOL. 
20 MR. PETERSON: HE CAN PUT HER ON ANOTHER 
21 TRACK. HE CAN REQUEST ANOTHER TRACK THAT — 
22 THE COURT: WHAT I WOULD DO IS STRONGLY 
23 REQUEST A TRACK WHEN HE'S OFF DURING THE SUMMER, IF YOU 
24 NEED A COURT ORDER TO HELP PUT HER ON THAT TRACK, THAT'S 
25 WHAT I WOULD RECOMMEND. BUT YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE TO 
1 REALLY DISCUSS IT WITH THEM IN DAVIS COUNTY. IF YOU ARE 
2 ON A GIVEN TRACK, IT WILL. BUT IF YOU ARE ON A DIFFERENT 
3 TRACK, YOU ARE STILL OUT THREE MONTHS DURING THE YEAR. 
4 SO YOU HAVE TO ADJUST THAT TIME SO THAT MRS. BARGAR HAS 
5 TWO MONTHS OF THAT TIME. 
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